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Are climate change policies fair to
vulnerable communities? The impact
of British Columbia's carbon tax and
Australia's carbon pricing policy on
indigenous communities

This paper compares carbon pricing policies in British Columbia and Australia in
order to identify differences between carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes
(ETS) from a fairness perspective. We examine how taxes and trading systems
impact indigenous communities in both jurisdictions. While the regressivity of
carbon pricing is a critical part of any fairness assessment, we argue that socioeconomic and cultural factors must also be taken into consideration. We discuss
the importance of accompanying carbon pricing with policies that mitigate not
only distributional impacts, but also additional impacts. These may be funded by
the revenue generated by the policy or by other sources of government revenue.
We argue in favour of devoting at least some portion of revenues generated by
the instruments to climate change mitigation, versus tax cuts, since vulnerable
communities are often disproportionately impacted by climate change. We
conclude that carbon pricing policies have the potential to be designed in a
way that is fair to indigenous communities. The devil is in the details. Both ETS
and carbon taxes have cost implications for disadvantaged groups such as
indigenous peoples, but they can both be designed in a way that compensates
fairly for these impacts. Ultimately, it is a political choice.
Les auteures comparent les politiques d'4tablissements des prix du carbone
en Colombie-Britannique et en Australie afin de determiner, d'une perspective
d'6quit6, les diff6rences entre les taxes sur le carbone et les programmes
d'dchange de droits d'dmission. Les auteures 6tudient les incidences des taxes
et des programmes d'dchange sur les collectivitas autochtones en ColombieBritannique et en Australie. M~me si le caractbre r6gressif de la tarification du
carbone est un 6idment critique de toute evaluation du caract~re 6quitable, les
auteures avancent qu'il faut egalement prendre en consid6ration les facteurs
socio-dconomiques et culture/s. El/es discutent de l'importance de jumeler
la tarification du carbone 6 des politiques qui attdnuent non seulement les
impacts r6partitifs, mais 6galement les autres impacts. Ces politiques pourraient
6tre financ~es par les recettes des politiques m~mes ou par d'autres sources
de recettes publiques. Les auteures plaident pour que soit consacrde J ce
financement une partie au moins des recettes provenant des instruments
d'attinuation des effets du changement climatique, au lieu d'une r6duction des
impits, puisque les collectivitds vulndrables sont souvent celles qui souffrent le
plus des incidences du changement climatique. Elles concluent qu'il est possible
de donner aux politiques de tarification du carbone une orientation 6quitable
envers les collectivit6s autochtones. Mais il faut porter une attention particulibre
aux dMtails : tant les programmes d'6change de droits d'6mission que les taxes
sur le carbone ont des consdquences financibres pour les groupes d6favorisds
comme les peuples autochtones, mais il est possible de faire en sorte qu'ils
offrent une indemnisation 6quitable pour ces impacts. Au bout du compte, le
choix est un choix politique.
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Introduction
One of the thorniest issues in the climate change debate is the tension
between those countries and communities who are the most vulnerable
to climate change' and those who bear the greatest responsibility for
creating the problem. 2 Relatively less attention is devoted to considering
how vulnerable populations within developed countries are impacted by

1. The poorest communities in developing countries form the most vulnerable group to the impacts
of climate change. Stricken with the burden of poverty, their lack of education, and resources, both
financial and informational, these communities are the least able to adapt to the effects of climate
change. See Benjamin J Richardson et al, eds, Climate Law and Developing Countries-Legal and
Policy Challengesfor the World Economy (Williston, Vermont: Edward Elgar, 2009); ML Parry et al,
eds, Climate Change 2007-Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contributionof Working Group
II to the FourthAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2007), online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.
html> [IPCC, Jmpacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) has identified low-lying developing states and coastal settlements in developing
countries, such as the mega-deltas of Asia and Africa, as the most vulnerable populations to the impacts
of climate change. See Parry, ibid at "Summary for Policymakers." The World Health Organisation
(WHO) estimates that climate change has caused 140,000 deaths worldwide annually between 1970
and 2004. The major causes of death are malaria, malnutrition, diarrhoeal diseases, air pollution, and
flooding. World Health Organization, Fact Sheet: Climate Change andHealth (January 2010), online:
WHO <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/index.html>.
2.
Most developing countries have a much smaller carbon footprint than developed countries. The
23 richest countries, which are home to only 14% of the world's population, produce 40% of the
world's total emissions. This inequity has prompted experts working on climate change to call this
phenomenon the world's largest regressive tax, with the poorest paying for the behaviour of the rich.
World Resources Institute, "Climate Analysis Indicators Tool 7.0" (2010), online: WRI <http://cait.
wri.org/>.
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climate change, including policies aimed at its mitigation.' When nations
decide to implement carbon pricing policies to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, how are the impacts of these policies distributed? Are
they creating undue hardship for vulnerable communities? Are they fair
policies?
We attempt to shed light on these questions by examining some of the
most vulnerable communities' in two of the most prosperous nationsindigenous communities in Australia and Canada. Our choice of study
countries is reflective of our respective expertise. We chose to study
indigenous communities because these communities are expected to face
a disproportionate burden from the impacts of climate change' and are
disadvantaged from a socioeconomic perspective.' Our paper investigates
whether these groups face an additional burden when mitigation policies,
through carbon pricing, are introduced into these jurisdictions.
The two carbon pricing policies that have garnered the most attention
in research and practice are carbon taxes and emissions trading (ETS).
These two policies are frequently examined for their efficacy, efficiency,
comprehensiveness, and impacts on competitiveness, among other
factors, and they are often compared with one another in an ongoing
debate about instrument choice and design.' While there are numerous

Kirk Smith, "The IPCC: Impressions from a Foot Soldier" (Speech delivered to the United
3.
Nations Association, International House, University of California, Berkeley, 24 October 2008);
Peggy M Shepard & Cecil Corbin-Mark, "Climate Justice" (2009) 2:4 Environmental Justice 163.
4.
We have used terms such as "vulnerable," "marginalized," and "disadvantaged" somewhat
interchangeably in this paper. While we appreciate the breadth of these terms, their individual
meanings, and the theoretical and nomenclatural debates they might each engender, we have opted
not to define them precisely. We use the terms to refer generally to a given population's vulnerability
to a variety of risks (social, physical, financial) and their underprivileged socioeconomic status. We
also do not wish to suggest that all members of a group are disadvantaged. There is great variability
and we wish to avoid victimizing the members of any group. For further reading on the meaning of
these terms, see these examples of articles discussing their meanings in the context of health issues:
Rearm G LeBlanc, "Definitions of Oppression" (1997) 4 Nursing Inquiry 257; Anne Fink, "Toward
a New Definition of Health Disparity: A Concept Analysis" (2009) 20:4 Journal of Transcultural
Nursing 349; JH Flaskerud & BJ Winslow, "Conceptualizing vulnerable populations in health-related
research" (1998) 47:2 Nursing Research 69.
5.
IPCC, Impacts, Adaptationand Vulnerability, supranote 1.
6.
We substantiate this point in Part 11:1 and in the case studies.
7.
See, e.g., National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Achieving 2050: A
Carbon PricingPolicy for Canada-TechnicalReport (Ottawa: 2011), online: nrtee <http:/nrteePaul Ekins &
tmee.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/carbon-pricing-tech-backgrounder-eng.pdf>;
Terry Baker, "Carbon Taxes and Emissions Trading" (2001) 15:3 J of Econ Surveys 325.
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studies considering the distributional impacts of carbon taxes,' there is
relatively little discussion about the overall fairness of these policies' and
even less analysis comparing the distributional aspects and fairness of the
two approaches. In other words, few researchers are evaluating whether
one policy is fairer and why. At first this may seem surprising given that
a principal theme of the climate change debate has been how the costs
and burdens of meeting Kyoto Protocoltargets can be shared in a manner
that is fair to all nations and affected groups. 0 There are, however, many
explanations for the paucity of research offering direct comparisons of the
fairness of carbon taxes and emissions trading systems. The fairness of a
carbon tax or emissions trading system depends largely on its design."
Since these policy instruments are relatively recent, and researchers may
perceive theoretical research on the question to be of limited value, the
See, e.g., Gilbert Metcalf, Apama Mathur & Kevin Hassett, Journal of Economic Surveys
8.
DistributionalImpacts in a Comprehensive Climate Policy Package (July 2011) online: National
Bureau of Economic Research <http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6l0l>; Mette Wier et al, "Are CO
2
Taxes Regressive? Evidence from the Danish Experience" (2005) 52 Ecological Economics 239;
Simon Dresner & Paul Ekins, "The Distributional Impacts of Economic Instruments to Limit
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transport" (London: Policy Studies Institute, 2004), online: PSI
<http://www.psi.org.uk/docs/rdp/rdpl9-dresner-ekins-transport.pdf>; Margaret Walls & Jean Hanson,
"Distributional Aspects of an Environmental Tax Shift: The Case of Motor Vehicle Emissions
Taxes" (1999) 52:1 National Tax Journal 53; David Anthoff & Richard SJ Tol, "On International
Equity Weights and National Decision-Making on Climate Change" (July 2010) 60:1 Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 14; Amy C Christian, "Designing a Carbon Tax: The
Introduction of the Carbon-Burned Tax (CBT)" (1991-1992) 10 UCLA J Envtl L & Pol'y 221; Mark
Brenner, Matthew Riddle & James K Boyce, "A Chinese Sky Trust? Distributional Impacts of Carbon
Charges and Revenue Recycling in China" (2007) 35:3 Energy Policy 1771; Hamilton & Cameron,
"Simulating the Distributional Effects of a Canadian Carbon Tax" (1994) XX:4 Canadian Public
Policy -Analyse de Politiques 385; Stefan Speck, "Energy and Carbon Taxes and Their Distributional
Implications" (1999) 27:11 Energy Policy 659; Henrik Klinge Jacobsen, Katja Birr-Pedersen & Mette
Weir, "Distributional Implications of Environmental Taxation in Denmark" (2003) 24:4 Fiscal Studies
477.
See Marc Lee & Toby Sanger,1sB.C. 's CarbonTax Fair?An ImpactAnalysisfor DifferentIncome
9.
Levels (Vancouver: CCPA, 2008), online: CCPA <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/BC
Office Pubs/bc_2008/ccpa bc carbontaxfaimess.pdf> at 11 [Lee & Sanger]; For a brief discussion
on fairness see Lawrence H Goulder & Ian WH Parry, "Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy"
(2008) 2:2 Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 152 at 164-166. Nathalie J Chalifour, "A
Feminist Perspective on Carbon Taxes" (2010) 21:1 CJWL 169.
10. There is an emerging body of literature on climate justice that includes discussions of fairness
in the context of international negotiations for climate policy. For instance, see Eric A Posner & Cass
R Sunstein, "Justice and Climate Change," Discussion Paper 2008-04 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Project on International Climate Agreements, 2008); Richard SJ Tol et al, "Distributional Aspects
of Climate Change Impacts" (2004) 14:3 Global Environmental Change 259; Sonja Klinsky & Hadi
Dowlatabadi, "Conceptualizations of Justice in Climate Policy" (2009) 9:1 Climate Policy 88. See
also Donald A Brown et al, White Paperon the EthicalDimensions of Climate Change(Philadelphia:
Pennsylvania State University, Rock Ethics Institute, 2006-2007), online: Rock Ethics Institute
<www.rockethics.psu.edu/climate>.
11. For instance, see Grant Boyle, "A Review of Emerging GHG Emissions Trading in North
America: Fragmentation or Progress?" (2008) 46:1 Alta L Rev 173 at 198-199.
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opportunity for research on the fairness of actual policies has only recently
arisen. A related explanation is that there is great diversity in the design of
existing and proposed carbon pricing policies, including hybrid "tax and
trade" plans, rendering it difficult to conduct a straightforward evaluation
of the distributional impacts or fairness of one policy versus another.
Another explanation for the lack of research in this area may be the
absence of an established methodology or conceptual framework within
which to undertake such an assessment. As an assessment of fairness must,
in our view, take into account more than tax incidence or financial cost,
and the required methodology is complicated; it requires drawiig from
numerous disciplines, including law, economics, psychology, sociology,
and others, to evaluate factors such as location, cultural habits, and lifestyle.
An added complication is that most authors tend to write in support of
either carbon taxes or emissions trading; therefore, their analyses may
emphasize the fairness (or unfairness) of one method without devoting
the same attention to the other. As Matthew Hennessey aptly observes:
"what's the difference between taxing carbon emissions and a marketbased system of cap and trade?.. .Which is fairer? It depends who you

ask."l 2
Despite the numerous challenges involved in conducting this type
of analysis, we attempt in this paper to contribute to the climate justice
debate as well as the literature on the fairness of environmental policies by
comparing the fairness of carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes using
two case studies. The carbon tax case study, based on British Columbia's
carbon tax," offers insights for jurisdictions opting for taxation. Australia
passed the Clean Energy LegislationPackage 2011 and it came into force
on 1 July 2012. This legislation puts a fixed price on carbon for three years,
with plans to transition the tax into an ETS as of 1 July 2015. We have
opted to analyse the future Australian ETS scheme in order to illustrate
the difference in impacts upon indigenous communities between an ETS
and a carbon tax. Although based on a number of assumptions relating to
design, 4 the ETS case study showcases lessons for Australia's transition
into an ETS in 2015 as well as other jurisdictions designing an ETS. Both
12. Matthew Hennessey, "Cap and Trade vs Carbon Tax" in Policy Innovations for a Fairer
Globalization (19 November 2007), online: Carnegie Council <http://www.policyinnovations.org/
ideas/briefings/data/cap tax> [Hennessey].
13. British Columbia is also pursuing a cap and trade system in collaboration with the Western
Climate Initiative (planned for launch in 2012); however, this paper limits the scope of analysis to the
carbon tax policy already in place.
14. As some features of the future ETS have not yet been detailed, our discussion will include some
assumptions based on the former Carbon PollutionReduction Scheme, which are likely to carry over
into the new scheme.
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case studies can, of course, be used to inform policy-makers in the design
of hybrid systems. Our analysis by no means exhausts all aspects of the
fairness question; it is a modest attempt to begin examining this important
question through a comparative approach, hopefully paving the way for
future research.
This paper has been structured to allow for a close analysis of
context and a full exposition of two case studies using our own analytical
framework. Part II looks at the impacts of climate change on indigenous
communities and offers some thoughts about what fairness is and how we
define this multi-faceted, complex concept for the purposes of the paper.
Part III sets out a framework of analysis to enable a comparison of carbon
pricing policies to better understand how they impact upon disadvantaged
groups. In Part IV we use this framework to examine the fairness of
British Columbia's carbon tax and Australia's proposed ETS regime with
respect to the indigenous communities in the respective jurisdictions. Part
V analyses what these two case studies show about the relative fairness
of taxes and trading, and offers some thoughts about how the fairness
of carbon pricing policies can be evaluated and what factors are most
important in this exercise. We conclude in Part VI.
I. Background and context
1. Indigenous communities and climate change
While the impacts of climate change will vary based on a wide range of
factors, those in our society who are already more vulnerable, such as
indigenous communities, are at greater risk of being impacted. 5 There are
many reasons for this including:
their close relationship with the environment, their reliance on the land
and sea for subsistence purposes, the fact that they are more likely to
inhabit areas of more severe impact such as coastal regions, often have
marginalized, and have
lower socioeconomic status, are more socially
6
services.1
care
health
quality
to
less access

15. IPCC, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, supra note 3. See also a quotation from Professor
Lesley Hughes, co-author of the Climate Commission Report, The CriticalDecade-Climate Change
and Health: "Climate change will also disproportionately affect those people in our society that are
already more vulnerable-so the elderly, those with existing heart and kidney disease, children, people
in remote communities and especially indigenous communities": Interview of Leslie Hughes by Tony
Eastly, ABC News (30 November 2011) online: <http://www.abc.net.aulam/content/20 11/s3379636.
htm>.
16. Christopher Furgal & Jacinthe Seguin, "Climate Change, Health, and Vulnerability in Canadian
Northern Aboriginal Communities" (2006) 114:12 Environmental Health Perspectives 1964,
online: National Center for Biotechnology Information <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC 1764172/>.
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Indigenous populations often lack the economic and technical
resources available to non-indigenous communities to respond to the social
and environmental challenges of climate change. These challenges include
the increased costs resulting from climate change policy, the potential for
decreased availability of water and food, decreased security and availability
of housing, and adverse health effects. These challenges are exacerbated
by a lower economic standard of living and less access to education and
training in indigenous communities." Many indigenous communities also
live in physically isolated, fragile, and harsh environments. In Australia,
the population of remote and very remote areas is made up of 25% of the
indigenous population and 2% of the non-indigenous population.19 Living
remotely can increase vulnerability to the impacts of climate change; for
example, it is expected that climate change will lead to greater frequency
of extreme weather events 20 and emergency responses can be slow to
reach remote indigenous communities. Active land management, such
as controlled burning, can go some way towards alleviating the impact
of extreme weather events, but in remote areas, there are often too few
people to respond with these practices. In Australia, for example, isolated
communities may have limited infrastructure and limited support from
early warning devices. 21

17. For details about income levels, see Part IV Case Studies. For details on education and training,
see Productivity Commission Report-Overcoming Indigenous DisadvantageKey Indicators2011,
Online: Australia <http://www.pc.gov.aul data/assets/pdf file/0010/l11610/key-indicators-2011overview-booklet.pdf>.
18. Indigenous Business Australia (IBA), Submission to the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme
Green Paper (10 September 2008) online: Australia <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/
submissions/cprs-green-paper/-/medialsubmissions/greenpaper/0698-indigenous-business-australia.
ashx>.
19. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4704.0-The Health and Welfare of Australia's Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (2008), online: ABS <http://www.abs.gov.aulausstats/abs@.nsf/
mf/4704.0/> [4704.0 Health and Welfare]. From the 2006 Census, 31% of Australia's indigenous
population lived in major cities with 22% living in inner regional areas, 22% in outer regional areas and
24% living in remote or very remote Australia. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4705.0-Population
Distribution,Aboriginal and Torres StraitIslanderAustralians (2006), online: ABS <http://www.abs.
gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4705.0Main+Featuresl2006?OpenDocument>. Very remote
Australia makes up seventy-five per cent of the Australian land mass. Jon Altman, Geoff Buchanan
& Libby Larsen, "The Environmental Significance of the Indigenous Estate: Natural Resource
Management as Economic Development in Remote Australia," Discussion Paper 286 (Canberra:
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, 2007) 286. 45% of
the population of very remote Australia is indigenous and if one takes away mining and service towns,
indigenous people comprise the majority (population) across very remote Australia.
20. IPCC, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, supra note 1.
21. Karen Bubna-Litic, "The Impacts of Carbon Pricing on Indigenous Communities: A Comparison
of New Zealand and Australia" in LH Lye et al, eds, CriticalIssues in Environmental Taxation (New
York: Oxford UP, 2009) 349 at 358.
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Indigenous communities in remote areas are often characterized not only
by lower average incomes, but also by poor quality housing, overcrowding,
and lack of connection to essential services.22 For example, in 2008 34%
of indigenous households in remote and very remote areas of Australia
lived in dwellings with major structural problems, compared with 24.5%
in non-remote areas. 23 In 2006, 25 discrete indigenous communities had
no organised sewerage supply and 142 discrete indigenous communities
reported sewerage overflows and leaks. 24 The poor quality of housing
also increases vulnerability to extreme weather events. 25 Housing design
can also have an impact. For instance, a study evaluating the impacts of
climate change on communities in Nunavik and Labrador identified a
problem resulting from the design of houses for northern climates. As a
result they lacked appropriate ventilation for the increasingly warm days
linked to climate change, which increased the risk of heat stress among
elderly on the warmest days. 26 Indigenous communities may also be
denied rights to property and land, which can make it difficult to access
credit and agricultural extension services. 27 In Canada, there are ongoing
and complex disputes over ownership of land within traditional territories,
with numerous repercussions for the indigenous peoples whose ability to
participate in the economy as autonomous entities is compromised.2 8
Another set of impacts is related to indigenous communities' reliance
on traditional forms of sustenance, such as hunting, fishing, and forestry,
otherwise known as the "hybrid economy." The 2002 National Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (NATSISS) showed that in
Australia, 80% of adults living in discrete indigenous communities fished
or hunted for their livelihood. 29 Loss of access to these resources, through
changes in the distribution of species and species abundance as a result of
climate change impacts on biodiversity, 0 risks impoverishing indigenous
22. Productivity Commission, Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage Report 2011, online: APC
<http://www.pc.gov.au/ data/assets/pdf file/0018/111609/key-indicators-2011-report.pdf>.
23. Ibid, ch 9.3.
24. Ibid.
25. See Bubna-Litic, supra note 21.
26. Furgal & Seguin, supra note 16.
27. Alyson Brody, Justina Demetriades & Emily Esplen, Genderand Climate Change:Mapping the
Linkages-A Scoping Study on Knowledge and Gaps 2008), online: BRIDGE <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/DFIDGenderClimate Change.pdf> at
11.
28. See Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Kent
McNeil, ''The Vulnerability of Indigenous Land Rights in Australia and Canada" (2004) 42 Osgoode
Hall L J 271.
29. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4714.0-NationalAboriginal and Torres Strait IslanderSocial
Survey (2002), online: ABS <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/4714.0/>.
30. See Bubna-Litic, supra note 21 at 357.
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people. For instance, wild food sources may diminish through biodiversity
impacts of climate change forcing indigenous communities to rely more
on non-traditional foods."1 Indigenous communities in BC are heavily
dependent upon forests and fisheries not only as a source of employment,
but also for subsistence. Over the last 50 years, British Columbia has
already experienced declining levels of precipitation and even more
profound variations in climate,32 and it is estimated that the forestry and
fisheries in BC will be heavily impacted by climate change.33
In the Canadian north, climate change may impact upon food security
because of changes in sea-ice access routes to hunting areas or ice-road
stability, which can impact upon hunting and subsistence as well as the
transportation of market foods.34 Turner and Clifton suggest that "many
Indigenous People are convinced that the effects of climate change are
already being felt and that their ability to harvest and process their food for
health and well-being is threatened." 5 One study raises the possibility of
impacts on mental health resulting from the reduced ability of community
members to practise aspects of traditional lifestyles.36 This is one example
of the vulnerability of indigenous health to the impacts of climate change.
Additionally, increases in temperature are predicted to lead to heat
stress and the spread of infectious diseases," which will be exacerbated
by limited access to health services. With the increased incidents of
storms and droughts, remote indigenous communities may be exposed to
contamination of drinking water through flooding and potentially unsafe
releases of wastewater into the environment." The impact of climate

31. Ibid.
32. Nancy Olewiler, Climate Change: BC's Progresstoward a Low-Carbon Economy (2009), online:
Business Council of British Columbia <http://www.bcbc.com/Documents/2020_200910_Olewiler.
pdf> at 3. Olewiler notes that, according to experts at a climate change adaptation conference, "once
in 50 years storms" now occur every 3 to 5 years.
33. Ibidat4-5.
34. Furgal & Seguin, supra note 16.
35. NJ Turner & H Clifton, "'It's so different today': Climate change and indigenous lifeways in
British Columbia, Canada" (2009) 19:2 Global Environmental Change 180 at 187. See also Arctic
Athabaskan Council, Climate Change in Northern Canada (2007) online: AAC <http://www.
arcticathabaskancouncil.com/aac/files/climate-change/Climate%20Change%20in%20Northem%20
Canada--AAC%20issues%20paper/o2OJanuary%202008%20(2).pdf>.
36. Furgal & Seguin, supranote 16.
37. Climate Commission Report, The CriticalDecade: Climate Change and Health (2011), online:
<http://climatecommission.gov.aulwp-content/uploads/ll 129_FINAL-FOR-WEB.pdf>.
38. Ibid.
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change on the Arctic and its Inuit population is well documented. 9 Some
populations, such as indigenous women in Canada, are particularly
vulnerable to climate change due to especially high rates of poverty,
pronounced health impacts, and the general vulnerability of the Arctic to
climate change. 40
The fact that indigenous communities may be particularly vulnerable
to the impact of climate change argues for implementing strong policies
to reduce the GHG emissions causing climate change. It follows that
effective carbon pricing policies are important to indigenous communities.
Now we turn to the question of how to define fairness so that we may aim
to design effective andfair carbon pricing policies.
2. Definingfairness
Fairness is one of those terms that is used ubiquitously and for which
most people have an intuitive sense of meaning. Yet, it is a term that is
not easily defined. As psychologist Skitka notes: "how people think about
fairness is contingent on what frame they are using to understand their
current situation." 4 1 Further, notions of what is fair are intricately linked
with related concepts of justice, equality, ethics, and morality. Gill North

39. See, for example, James D Ford, Dangerous Climate Change and the Importance ofAdaptation
for the Arctic s Inuitpopulation (2009) 4:024006 Environmental Research Letters, online: IOPscience
<http://iopscience.iop.org/ 748-9326/4/2/024006/pdf/1 748-9326_4_2 024006.pdf>. In fact, the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference (ICC) submitted a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) in 2005 alleging violations of their human rights from global warming caused by
greenhouse gas emissions from the US Inuit Circumpolar Council (Canada): Press Release, "Inuit
Petition Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Oppose Climate Change Caused by the
United States of America" (7 December 2005), online: ICC <http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/
index.php?Lang-En&ID=316>. On 16 November 2006 the IACHR rejected the petition without
prejudice, declaring that the evidence of the alleged harm was not sufficient to proceed. A year later
the ICC requested a hearing with the IACHR to assist the Commission in recognizing the relationship
between climate change and human rights. On I February 2007, the Commission invited the Centre
for International Environmental Law (CIEL), Earthjustice, and the ICC to submit testimonials on
global warming's impact on human rights and specifically the vulnerable Inuit community. Centre for
International Environmental Law, Testimony of Sheila Watt-Cloutier (1 March 2007), online: CIEL
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IACHR-WCMar07.pdf>. The Commission was predicted to
release a report on climate change and human rights in 2010, but the report has not been issued as of
time of writing. Policy Research Initiative, Climate Change, Well-being and Human Rights (23 June
2010), online: Canada <http://www.horizons.gc.ca/doclib/2010-0042-eng.pdf>.
40. See Erin Wolski, "Culturally Relevant Gender-based Analysis: A tool to promote equity" (20082009) 11:1 Canadian Women's Health Network 26 at 26, who notes that over 40% of Aboriginal
women in Canada live in poverty.
41. Linda Skitka, "Exploring the 'Lost and Found' of Justice Theory" (2009) 22:1 Social Justice
Research 98 at 104.
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notes that, "[p]hilosophers, lawyers and economists have been debating
notions of justice, morality, fairness and equality for many centuries."4 2
Many of the discussions about the fairness of environmental policies
have centred on their distributive aspects.43 In other words, the focus has
been largely on how the costs and benefits of environmental policies are
distributed among various members of a given collective.44 Distributive
justice is undoubtedly a major component of fairness, but it can be seen
as one piece of a larger puzzle. For instance, fairness requires not only
distributive (substantive) justice, but also procedural justice,4 5 which
focuses on questions such as who is engaged in the design of the policy
and the political acceptability of the process. 46 While we acknowledge
the complexities involved, we will define fairness as incorporating both
substantive and procedural justice.

42. Gill North, "Efficiency, Fairness & Irrationality: Incompatible or Complimentary?" (2009) 24:2
BFLR 311 at 330. There is no shortage of discussion about the meaning of the terms justice and fairness
and their application: from the Rawlsian normative theory of justice [John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)] to Edith Brown Weiss' discussion of fairness to
future generations [In Fairnessto Future Generations:InternationalLaw, Common Patrimony and
IntergenerationalEquity (Tokyo: United Nations UP, 1989)].
43. For example, Ys6 Serret & Nick Johnstone, eds, The DistributionalEffects of Environmental
Policy (Paris: OECD, 2006); Don Fullerton, "A Framework to Compare Environmental Policies"
(2001) 68:2 Southern Economic Journal 224; Richard J Lazarus, "Pursuing 'Environmental Justice':
The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection" (1993) 87:3 Nw UL Rev 787. See also David
G Duff, "Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix" (Delivered at the colloquium on Tax Policy and Public
Finance, New York University School of Law, 12 March 2009), [unpublished].
44. Distributive justice concerns the distribution of social resources or "the perceived fairness of
the shape, end state or outcome of the resource allocation": Kjell Y Tdrnblom & Ridl Vermont, "An
Integrative Perspective on Social Justice: Distributive and Procedural Fairness Evaluations of Positive
and Negative Outcome Allocations" (1999) 12:1 Social Justice Research 39 [Tomblom & Vermunt].
The literature on distributive justice has exploded over the last three decades. Barry Markovsky &
C Wesley Younts, "Prospects for Distributive Justice Theory" (2001) 14:1 Social Justice Research
45. Spanning numerous disciplines, including sociology, psychology, economics, political sciences,
philosophy, and law, the literature contains numerous theories that can be loosely classified into micro
and macro levels and procedural and distributive definitions of justice. A more recent trend has been
interdisciplinary research which attempts to provide a more comprehensive and rich approach to
distributive justice. See, Dahlia Moore, "The Sense of Justice-An Introduction" (2001) 14:3 Social
Justice Research 233.
45. Procedural justice concerns the "perceived fairness of the process of resource allocation, or the
way in which the final resource allocation is accomplished": Timblom & Vermunt, supranote 44 at
40.
46. Some posit that the distributive and procedural aspects ofdistributive justice cannot be considered
separately. Tomblom & Vermont, supra note 44 citing J Brockner & B Wiesenfield, "An Integrative
Framework for Explaining Reactions to Decisions: Interactive Effects of Outcomes and Procedures"
(1996) 120:2 Psychological Bulletin 189. Tdrnblom and Vermunt developed an integrative theory
of justice that assumes interdependence between distributive outcome, distribution procedure, and
outcome valence, and posits that "people's conception of the overall or total fairness of a situation is,
in different degrees, assumed to be based on" these three factors. Tirnblom & Vermunt, supranote 44
at 43.
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Scholarship relating to justice and fairness often includes references to
equality and equity as objectives against which we measure fairness. Like
with justice and fairness, there is an impressive breadth and complexity of
literature discussing these terms, with a variety of often evolving or even
conflicting theoretical underpinnings. The concept of "equity" has widely
varying meanings within different disciplines. For example, the "equity
principle," which has become a "central paradigm in the empirical study
of distributive justice in psychology, social psychology and sociology,"47
holds that people expect rewards to (1) reflect their level of investment and
contribution and (2) correspond to the level of reward others receive in
return for the same level of investment and contribution.4 8 In economics,
equity usually refers to distributional fairness or a fair distribution of
welfare.4 9 In common law, equity usually refers to the set of remedies
traditionally offered by courts of equity, in which litigants seek "fair"
remedies not available under common law principles. Equity also has
a specific meaning in the context of intergenerational equity." Relying
upon discussions by Professor Edith Brown Weiss in her seminal work
In Fairnessto Future Generations," Collins notes: "equity concerns the
just allocation of benefits.. .and presumably also burdens."5 2 Equity in the
context of international climate change policy incorporates the concept of
"common but differentiated responsibility."" Discussions of equity also
arise in fiscal policy; for example, tax policy is generally concerned with
horizontal equity, which aims to ensure that taxpayers in similar financial
circumstances bear similar tax burdens (based on ability to pay), and

47. Clara Sabbagh, "A Taxonomy of Normative and Empirically Oriented Theories of Distributive
Justice" (2001) 14:3 Social Justice Research 237 at 249.
48. Ibid, citing George C Homans, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt
Brace Janovich, 1974). The equity principle has been subject to numerous criticisms, including those
who note it is not universally applicable to the distribution of all social resources in different contexts
and that it represents middle-class conceptions lodged in Western values of individualism, competition
and instrumentalism. Ibid at 251 citing EE Sampson, "On Justice as Equality" (1975) 31 J Soc Issues
45.
49. Business Dictionary.com,online:
<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/economicequity.html>, sub verbo "economic equity".
50. Lynda M Collins, "Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental
Governance" (2007) 30 Dal LJ 79.
51. Weiss, supra note 42.
52. See Collins, supra note 50 at 32.
53. Article 3 of the United NationsFramevorkConvention on Climate Change states: "The parties
should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind,
on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effect thereof": 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21
March 1994) [UNFCCC].
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vertical equity, which posits that people with greater ability to pay should
pay more taxes (in order to promote a fair distribution of net income).5 4
Equality, which suggests an objective of equal treatment or sameness,
has been criticized on the basis that fairness does not necessarily result
from treating everyone in the same way. As Donna Greschner argues,
formal equality
is at best problematic for aboriginal women and men because... aboriginal
societies are grounded in notions of harmony, complementarity and
balance, not sameness. At worst, the sameness conception of equality is
a tool of cultural impoverishment and assimilation."
Currently, the approach of substantive equality, which evolved from
human rights and constitutional law, is concerned with difference in
society. The goal of substantive equality is to transform social patterns
of discrimination. 6 The basic idea is to challenge mainstream norms and
overcome historical disadvantage in order to achieve an outcome that
reflects "the belief that each member of society has equal moral worth
and as a consequence is entitled to equal consideration in how society
is organized and structured."" Penney asserts that "substantive equality
is a principle that affirms differences not through categorization, but by
recognizing them and accounting for them within a broader constitutional
framework."" It focuses on equality of results rather than equality of
opportunity.
In this paper, we opt to use substantive equality as our criterion of
fairness because it looks at equality in the context of real difference and as
a social construct. As Justice Rosalie Abella has observed:
It is the very dynamism of equality that makes it so elusive an objective.
In examining the theories of equality promulgated through history,
54. Within the field of public finance, there are studies examining the incidence of taxation as
compared with government expenditures to determine the overall increase or decrease in welfare
for citizens within the jurisdiction. See Tibor Barna, Redistribution of Incomes through Public
Finance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945) (one of the seminal works on fiscal incidence). See also
Andrew Chamberlain & Gerald Prante, Who Pays Taxes and Who Receives Government Spending?
An Analysis ofFederal,State and Local Tax and Spending Distributions,1991-2004, (2007), online:
The Tax Foundation <http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/2282.html> for a discussion of fiscal
incidence in the US. See also, Duff, supra note 43.
55. Donna Greschner, "Aboriginal Women, the Constitution and Criminal Justice" (1992) UBCL
Rev 338 at para 5.
56. Gillian Calder, Book Review of The GenderofConstitutionalJurisprudenceby Beverley Baines
& Ruth Rubio-Marin, eds (2006) 44 Alta L Rev 465 at para 20.
57. Patricia Hughes, "Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle"
(1999) 22 Dal LJ 5.
58. Jonathan Penney, "A Constitution for the Disabled or a Disabled Constitution? Toward a New
Approach to Disability for the Purposes of Section 15(1)" (2002) 1 JL & Equality 83 at para 43.
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one is struck by the obvious-the extent to which its cogency and
implementation are affected by the social environment from which it
draws oxygen."
Having settled on substantive equality as a yardstick against which to
consider the fairness of carbon pricing policies, we look more closely at
fairness in the context of carbon taxes and emissions trading.
3. Fairnessin carbon taxes and emission tradingschemes
There has been a lot of discussion in the context of international climate
change negotiations as to what is the fairest way to cut global greenhouse
gas emissions. While the end result has been a form of "common but
differentiated responsibility," various commentators have proposed a per
capita allowance as the fairest approach,6 0 which suggests that an equality
principle informs their notion of fairness.
With respect to fairness at the state level, we have already noted that
there is research discussing and assessing the distributional effects of
carbon taxes, but relatively less research on the distributional impacts of
ETS and comparing the potential for taxes and trading to be designed in
a way that maximizes fairness defined more broadly (i.e., going beyond
distributional effects). In this section, we attempt to summarize what has
been written about how these two carbon pricing policies compare with
respect to fairness. We identify three issues that can influence the fairness
of carbon pricing policies: regressive impacts, procedural fairness, and
distribution of any revenue gains.

59. Rosalie Abella, "The Dynamic Nature of Equality" in S Martin & K Mahoney, eds, Equality and
Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 3 at 4.
60. This idea has been suggested by several authors, including Albert Mumma & David Hodas,
"Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human Development"
(2008) The Georgetown Int'l Envtl L Rev 619. Peter Singer argues that the fairest way to cut global
greenhouse gas emissions is to give each person on earth an equal share of the atmosphere's capacity
to absorb our greenhouse gas emissions, regardless of who produces it. He suggests to first set a global
target beyond which climate change could become extremely dangerous. Then divide that total by the
world's population, and calculate each person's share of the total. The next step would be to allocate
to each country a greenhouse gas emissions quota equal to the country's population, multiplied by the
per person share and finally, allow countries that need a higher quota to buy it from those that emit less
than their quota. The practical benefits of such a suggestion include giving developing nations a strong
incentive to accept mandatory quotas, because if they can keep their per capita emissions low, they will
have excess emissions rights to sell to industrialized nations. Rich countries will benefit too because
they will be able to choose their preferred mix of reducing emissions and buying up emissions rights
from developing nations. This proposal has real potential because it will allow developing countries to
develop and at the same time to develop with the least emissions possible. It is, of course, dependent
on the total number of emissions available and the stringency of the cap. Peter Singer, A FairDeal on
Climate Change (26 June 2007), online: Carnegie Council <http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/
commentary/data/per capita emissions>.
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a. Regressive impacts
Absent government intervention, both carbon taxes and ETS are regressive,
meaning that they have a greater impact on low income individuals or
families than on wealthier ones. This is not surprising given that both
are carbon pricing policies that lead to higher prices. The extent of their
regressivity will be determined by a variety of design factors for each
instrument, such as the rate and scope of the measure. Neither policy
is necessarily more nor less regressive-the degree of regressivity will
depend on the extent of the price increases generated by the policy. The
extent of regressivity can also be influenced by the methodology used to
measure it. For instance, Hassett et al find variation in regressivity when
the impacts of a carbon tax are measured using lifetime spans versus
shorter time-frames. 6'
Despite some variability, the fact that carbon taxes are regressive in
the absence of mitigating policies is widely acknowledged and discussed
in the literature. 62 Carbon pricing policies are designed to increase prices
of carbon intensive goods and services, so it is no surprise that they render
certain goods and services more expensive for people with lower incomes.
One study notes that the top 20% of US households spend 2.3% of their
after-tax income on gasoline while the lowest quintile spend 9.1%, which
is four times as high. 63 This means that low income households are bearing
a greater relative burden of the price increase created by a carbon tax on
gasoline. At its initial rate of ten dollars per tonne of CO 2e and absent any
compensating policies, the BC carbon tax was estimated to increase costs

61. See Kevin A Hassett, Aparna Mathur & Gilbert E Metcalf, The Incidence ofa US Carbon Tax:
A Lifetime and Regional Analysis Working Paper No 14241 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2007), online: National Bureau for Economic Research <http://www.
nber.org/papers/w13554.pdf > at 14. See also Shi-Ling Hsu & Robin Elliot, "Regulating Greenhouse
Gases in Canada: Constitutional and Policy Dimensions" (2009) 54:3 McGill LJ 463.
62. See for example, Gilbert E Metcalf & David Weisbach, "The Design of a Carbon Tax" (2009)
33 Harv Envtl L Rev 499; S Stoft, "Revenues from Carbon Pricing: Why Their Use Is, in Essence,
Funded by a Capitation Tax" (2 January 2009) online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1317507>. However, note Hsu and Elliot suggest it may be simplistic to conclude
that carbon taxes are regressive based on selective anecdotes. They question, for instance, whether
regressivity should be assessed based on lifetime income or consumption versus a snapshot in time,
and whether methodologies are sufficiently complex (for instance, taking into account price elasticity
of impacted goods): ibid at 510-511.
63. Carbon Tax Center, Managing Impacts: Demographics (6 July 2010), online: <CTC http://
www.carbontax.org/issues/softening-the-impact-of-carbon-taxes/>. The Carbon Tax Center (CTC) is
careful to point out that in absolute terms the rich would shoulder a greater burden of the carbon tax:
"when all household outlays for gasoline are apportioned among quintiles, the highest-earning quintile
accounted for 32% of the total, while the lowest quintile contributed just 9%." See also Hassett, supra
note 61.
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by 0.7% of income for families in the lowest income quintile versus 0.3%
of income for families in the highest income quintile.'
The research shows that emissions trading without offsetting policies
is also regressive. A survey of economic models concluded that if a cap
and trade system was announced ten years in advance, 94 to 96 percent
of the costs would be initially born by consumers. 65 The distribution of
those costs would be regressive, with the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimating that "the price rises resulting from a 15 percent cut
in CO 2 emissions would cost the average household in the lowest onefifth (quintile) of the income distribution about 3.3 percent of its average
income. By comparison, a household in the top quintile would pay about
1.7 percent of its average income.1"66 The CBO suggests that the regressivity
exists regardless of how permits are allocated. 67 Modelling in Australia
has found that the impact of a $23 carbon price will result in an overall
household increase of $9.90, reflecting a consumer price increase of 0.7%
in the fixed price period (2012-2013) and increasing another 0.2% with
the introduction of the ETS in 2015-2016.68 Earlier modelling found that
the impact of a $25 carbon price would result in an increase of 2.2% in
annual expenditures for a working-age, social security dependent family
using utility-adjusted figures, as compared to a 0.4% increase for a highincome tertiary educated household. 69
, We will explore the issue of regressive impacts further in each case
study, and elaborate our findings in the discussion section (Part V).
b. Proceduralfairness
Questions of procedural fairness raise more variability between carbon
taxes and ETS. One aspect of evaluating procedural fairness involves

64. See Lee & Sanger, supranote 9.
65. Mark Lasky, The Economic Costs of Reducing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases: A Survey of
Economic Models (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2003), quoted in CBO, "Tradeoffs in Allocating Allowances for C02 Emissions" (April 2007), online: CBO <http://.cbo.gov/
publication/19445> at note 3 [CBO].
66. Ibid at 3.
67. Regardless of how the allowances were distributed, most of the cost of meeting a cap on CO 2
emissions would be borne by consumers, who would face persistently higher prices for products such
as electricity and gasoline. Those price increases would be regressive in that poorer households would
bear a larger burden relative to their income than wealthier households would: ibid at 1.
68. Australian Government Treasury, Modelling a Carbon Price, online: Australia <http://www.
archive.treasury.gov.au/carbonpricemodelling/content/default.asp> at 8.
69. Modelling by the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) in 2007,
referenced in Damian Sullivan & Josie Lee, "A National Energy Efficiency Program for Low-Income
Households: Responding Equitably to Climate Change" in Imogen Jubb, Paul Holper & Wenju Cai,
eds, ManagingClimate Change: Papersfrom the Greenhouse2009 Conference(Collingwood: CSIRO
Publishing, 2010) 155 at 156 [Sullivan & Lee].
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considering the extent to which the public can meaningfully participate in
the process of selecting and designing the policy. In Australia, indigenous
groups are much less likely than industry counterparts to be present in the
consultation processes relating to policy development. In developing the
Clean Energy Legislative Package, the Australian government established
2 roundtables 0 that would advise ministers to help inform the positions the
government took to the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee." One was
a nineteen member business roundtable,7 2 with an Industry Transitional
Assistance Working Group of 15 members and an Energy Sector Working
Group comprising 16 members. There was also a NGO Roundtable" with
20 members, of which one was the North Australian Indigenous Land
and Sea Management Alliance. This potential for under-representation is
complicated by the fact that less mainstream cultural groups are not well
represented among the decision-makers and other influential players in the
74
policy process.
Another aspect of procedural fairness relates to the negotiating power
of stakeholders involved in the policy process. Large, well-financed
companies and industry groups are often resourced to lobby for favourable
treatment in the development of policies. It could be argued that taxation
offers fewer avenues of influence to groups with disparate negotiating
powers, as compared to an ETS, but this depends on the actual design
of the tax. In the fixed price period of the Australian carbon pricing
policy, industry groups were able to receive free carbon units to meet
their carbon liability under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program" as
well as additional assistance under specific industry initiatives. Generally
the flexibility of initial design in an ETS, as opposed to a tax, creates
more opportunity for industry groups to lobby in favour of grandfathering
permits. The relatively less powerful lobby force of groups arguing for
70. Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Roundtables
on Climate Change, online: Australia <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/
roundtables-on-climatechange.aspx>.
71. Australian Government, Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Media Release,
"government to seek business, environment and non-Government organisations' views on climate
change" (September 2010) online: Australia <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/en/minister/gregcombet/20 10/media-releases/September/mr20100927a.aspx>.
72. Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Business
Roundtable, online: Australia <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/govemment/initiatives/roundtableson-climatechange/business-roundtable.aspx>.
73. Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Non-Government
<http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/
Organisation Roundtable, online: Australia
initiatives/roundtables-on-climatechange/ngo-roundtable.aspx>.
74. For example, there is currently one indigenous member of Federal Parliament, elected to
represent a seat in Western Australia in August 2010.
75. Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), ss 143-158.
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auctioning permits to create revenue for mitigating policies may be less
able to influence design. In Australia, the coal and steel industries lobbied
hard and received favourable treatment in the design of the scheme over and
above industry assistance for emissions intensive, trade exposed industries
under the Jobs and Competitiveness Program." For example, the steel
industry is to receive $300m over 4 years for those producing more than
500,000t of crude carbon steel under the Steel Transformation Plann and
the coal industry will receive $1.3b over 6 years in structural adjustment
to manage their emissions under the Coal Sector Jobs Package" and $70m
over 6 years to support investment in carbon abatement policies under the
9
Coal Mining Abatement Technology Support Package.7
Processes for choosing and developing carbon pricing policies vary
widely among jurisdictions, and it is difficult to point to carbon taxes or
ETS as offering an inherently better opportunity for fair representation of
different voices. However, given that ETS schemes require the development
of institutional and administrative structures, as well as elaborate enabling
legislation, there may be greater opportunity to create mechanisms to
promote fair representation of different perspectives in the process. Of
course, if these new institutional and administrative structures are created
in a way that does not ensure adequate and meaningful representation of
various perspectives, as could be argued with only one representative of
indigenous communities on the Australian roundtables,so opportunities for
additional fairness are lost. In contrast, the implementation of a carbon
tax can be done in the context of existing institutional and administrative
structures, and with modest legislative adjustments. As such, there is
less flexibility and opportunity to enhance fairness through inclusion of
different cultural perspectives in the existing structures.
c. Revenue use
The third issue, and arguably the most important to fairness, is what is
done with the revenue generated from taxes and emissions trading scheme,
if any. One of the defining features of carbon taxes is that they generate
a relatively clear and predictable stream of revenue. That revenue can be
used in numerous ways and a key issue in assessing fairness is how that
76. Ibid.
77. Clean Energy Future, Support for the Steel Industry, online: Australia <http://www.
cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/support-for-the-australian-steel-industry/>.
78. Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Coal Mining
Assistance, online: Australia <http://wwwclimatechange.gov.aulgovemmentlinitiatives/coal.aspx>.
79. Ibid.
80. To put this in perspective, it should be noted that around 22% of Australia's land is in indigenous
ownership.
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revenue is used. David Duff argues that the fairness of any tax expenditure
should depend solely on the justice of the regulatory goal that it is trying to
achieve."' While this is a sound proposition, we argue that policy-makers
should be attentive to the risks of creating unintended distributional
consequences in allocating revenue. For instance, a carbon tax policy has
a regulatory goal of addressing climate change, which would suggest that
allocating carbon tax revenues towards climate change mitigation would
be fair. If, however, the tax expenditures are aimed at improving energy
efficiency (in line with the regulatory goal), but are designed in a way that
makes them inaccessible to certain segments of society, i.e., renters, then
they are not necessarily fair.
In the case of emissions trading, if allowances are auctioned, then the
permits generate revenue, which could be used to fund policies to offset
regressivity. If all of the allowances are given away for free (grandfathered),
then the initial allocation produces no government revenue with which to
fund policies to offset impacts. Some writers characterize grandfathering
permits as "a de facto wealth transfer to large polluters."82 The CBO is
quite specific with its concern in this respect:
Because most of the cost of the cap would ultimately be borne by
consumers, giving away nearly all of the allowances to affected energy
producers would mean that the value of the allowances they received
would far exceed the costs they would bear. As a result, that allocation
strategy would increase producers' profits without lessening consumers'
costs. In essence, such a strategy would transfer income from energy
consumers-among whom lower-income households would bear
disproportionately large burdens-to shareholders of energy companies,
who are disproportionately higher-income households."
Under the new Australian Clean Energy Legislative Package, in the
fixed period (2012-2015) free carbon units may be bought back by the
government at a discounted rate representing present market value.84 This
could be seen as a windfall gain or evidence that those emissions intensive,
trade-exposed companies have reduced their emissions through changing
practices and, therefore are producing less carbon emissions than their
allocated free carbon units.
In many emissions trading schemes, only some permits are
grandfathered (often the initial ones) with the remainder being auctioned.
We will examine the issue of revenue use-a critical aspect of designing
81.
82.
83.
84.

Duff, supranote 43.
Hennessey, supra note 12.
CBO, supra note 65 at 2.
Supra note 75, s 116.
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fair carbon pricing policies-in the context of both case studies below. It
is important to point out that there is nothing to preclude a government
from devoting resources outside of those generated by a carbon pricing
policy to offsetting policies. In fact, many governments resist earmarking
revenue as it can limit government spending flexibility; however, devoting
revenues generated from a carbon pricing policy is one way to ensure that
there are sufficient revenues available to mitigate distributional impacts
and address other fairness challenges.
II. The analyticalframework
Putting a price on carbon is an important part of any climate change plan.
Pricing carbon, however, will impact on indigenous communities and
other disadvantaged groups in many ways, with the extent of that impact
influenced by their specific consumption and production activities. On the
consumption side, the overall price impact of the policy on an individual
household's welfare will depend on many factors, such as the actual
carbon price, the extent to which the carbon costs are reflected in the price
of goods, individual consumption patterns, the individual household's
level of disposable income, the assistance provided to households by the
government to manage the impacts of the scheme, and the ability of the
household to adjust consumption patterns in response to higher carbon
prices. On the production side, the economic sector in which a person
is employed will influence the impact of a carbon pricing policy on that
individual. For indigenous communities, these could include agriculture,
fishing, forestry, mining, and tourism.
In order to frame the discussion of our case studies and facilitate a
comparison of carbon taxes and ETS, we have developed the following
framework (summarized in Table I below) and identified criteria to be
used in assessing the fairness of climate change policies.
1. Design
The basic design elements of a carbon pricing policy, scope and rates,
will largely determine the extent to which prices of goods and services
increase. In addition, the policies for how any revenue generated will
be used are very important in determining the fairness of a measure. In
our discussion on design, we will therefore describe the scope, rate, and
revenue-use policies related to the carbon tax and ETS.
2. Cost implications
A key consideration in assessing the fairness of a carbon pricing measure
is to determine the direct and indirect costs of the measure and how those
costs are distributed among those who bear them. It is also important to
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consider what factors beyond income levels might impact upon a person's
ability to deal with increased costs. As such, in this section, we identify
as relevant factors for consideration: the direct and indirect costs of the
policy (absent any mitigating policies), how those costs are distributed
among different income levels (regressivity), and other factors (socioeconomic and cultural factors) that influence the ability to deal with greater
costs. Specifically, in relation to socio-economic and cultural factors, we
examine remoteness, housing, and employment in impacted sectors. There
are many links between income levels and the socio-economic and cultural
factors that we discuss in this section. For instance, type and quality of
housing is obviously linked to income levels; however, we believe that
it is important to grant these factors separate consideration in order to
adequately assess fairness in policy choice and design.
3. Impact of complementarypolicies
We also evaluate how policies accompanying the carbon tax or ETS
impact upon indigenous communities. We focus on the policies for using
the revenue generated by the measure (rather than evaluating the broader
climate change plans in which the carbon tax or emissions trading schemes
are embedded) and any exemptions or mitigation policies in addition to
revenue use (if any) that are integral to the carbon pricing policy.
4. Impact of outcome (effectiveness in reducing GHG emissions)
A fourth component of our framework is how the policy will impact upon
climate change itself. An effective carbon pricing policy that succeeds in
reducing GHG emissions and slowing the impact of climate change will
have a beneficial positive impact on vulnerable communities, because,
as the IPCC has found, vulnerable communities are disproportionately
impacted by climate change." A carbon pricing policy is meant to have a
transformative impact upon the economy by redirecting investments into
low-carbon activities. We believe it is relevant to consider the effectiveness
of the policies in addressing climate change because failure to mitigate
will place a disproportionate burden on indigenous communities. Because
there is little research on the effectiveness of carbon pricing policies,

85.

IPCC, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, supra note 1.
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given how recent they are,8 6 we note the relevance of this issue but do not
analyze it in this paper.
Table 1: Framework for Assessing Fairness of a Carbon Pricing Policy
Impact of complementary

Design

Cost Implications

Scope

Direct and indirect costs

Policies regarding use of
revenue (if any)

Rate

Regressive impacts

Exemptions and mitigation
policies outside of revenue
use (if any)

Policies for Revenue Use

Socio-economic/cultural
challenges of adapting to
increased costs

policies

III. Case studies
A. BC carbon tax
1. Design
British Columbia implemented a carbon tax as part of its climate change
strategy, which aims to reduce the province's GHG emissions to 33%
below 2007 levels by 2020.7
a. Scope
The carbon tax, which came into force on July 2008, is a consumption tax
on the purchase or importation of fuels, including gasoline, diesel, natural
gas, and coal." It applies to virtually all GHG emissions from residential,
commercial, and industrial sources burning fossil fuel in the province.
This accounts for an estimated 73% of the province's GHG emissions. The
carbon tax does not cover GHG emissions from non-combustion sources,

86. There have been some predictions made; for instance, modelling done for the BC government
predicted a 4% decrease in GHG emissions from business-as-usual levels by 2020 attributable to the
BC carbon tax. See Government of British Columbia, Climate Action Plan (Victoria: Climate Action
Secretariat, Office of the Premier, June 2008) cited in Marc Lee, Fairand Effective Carbon Pricing:
Lessonsfrom B.C. (2011), online: Policy Alternatives <http://www.policyaltematives.ca/publications/
reports/fair-and-effective-carbon-pricing> at 13 [Lee, "Fair and Effective"].
87. See British Columbia, Climate Action Plan (2008), online: BC <http://www.livesmartbc.cal
attachments/climateactionplan web.pdf>. The plan includes a variety of initiatives, including
participating in the Western Climate Initiative, a regional cap and trade program, and investments
in such things as public transit. These GHG emissions targets are embodied in the Greenhouse Gas
Reduction TargetsAct, SBC 2007, C 42.
88. Carbon Tax Act, SBC 2008, c 40. For a thorough overview of the measure, see David G Duff,
"The Reality of Carbon Taxes in the 21st Century: Carbon Taxation in British Columbia" (2008) 10 Vt
J Envtl L 87.
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such as emissions from industrial processes in cement and aluminium
production and methane emitted from landfills."
First Nations (as defined within the federal Indian Act90) are exempted
from paying the carbon tax on fuel when the sale occurs on reserve land."
Sales of fuel off-reserve are subject to the carbon tax unless the fuel is
purchased for delivery to a reserve.
b. Rate
The rate of the tax is established for five years, starting at $10 per tonne
of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2e) (2.4 cents per litre for gasoline) on 1
July 2008 and rising by $5 per year to achieve $30 per tonne of CO 2e (6.67
cents per litre) by 1 July 2012.92 The BC government has not declared its
intentions for the carbon tax post 2012. The October 2011 Speech from the
Throne referred to the role of the carbon tax in reducing GHG emissions,
but did not specify what would happen post 2012 .3 As part of consultations
for the next budget, an all-party finance committee recommended freezing
the rate of the carbon tax at the 2012 level.94

89. See Lee & Sanger, supra note 9 at 9; Matt Home, Building a Low-Carbon Economy in British
Columbia: Recommendations to Strengthen B.C. 's Carbon Tax (2010), online: Pembina Institute
<http://bc.pembina.org/pub/1961>.
90. RSC, 1985, c 1-5.
91. British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, Tax Bulletin - MFT-CT002, (July 2010, Revised October
2010), online: BC <http://www.rev.gov.bc.ca/documents-library/bulletins/mft-ct-002.pdf>.
92. Carbon Tax Act, supra note 88. See also, Government of British Columbia, Ministry of Finance,
Tax Schedule: Carbon Tax Rates by Fuel Type - From January 1, 2010 (September 2009, revised
November 2010), online <http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/Carbon tax rates byfuel type from
Jan 2010.pdf>. The Act creates an administrative system for the collection of taxes that mirrors that
of the province's existing fuel taxes: see ss 3, 17, 13(2). Gasoline prices in BC have varied by roughly
70 cents over the last 3 years. The distributional impacts of these price changes are, of course, greater
than those for the much smaller changes attributable to the carbon tax. We raise this not to undermine
the importance of doing a fairness analysis of carbon pricing instruments, but to highlight the need to
consider fairness at all times. For instance, the fluctuating gas prices due to the market create hardships
for disadvantaged groups such that governments should ensure a strong policy base to protect these
groups against the impacts of these market conditions.
93. British Columbia, Speech from the Throne (3 October 2011), online: BC <http://www.leg.
bc.ca/39th4th/Speech%20from%20ThroneOct%20201 1_WEB.pdf>.
94. British Columbia, Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, Report on
the Budget 2012 Consultations (15 November 2011) at 41. As required under the Carbon Tax Act,
the British Columbia Government reports all carbon tax revenues and rebates through the 2012-13
fiscal year. British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, Budget andFiscalPlan2010/11-2012/13 (2 March
2010), online: BC <http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2010/bfp/2010 Budget FiscalPlan.pdf> at 105
[BC Fiscal Plan]. However, this period, which extends to 2012-2013 is referred to as the "phase-in
period," indicating the provincial government has considered this tax as a critical component of its
long term Climate Action Plan which extends to 2020, supra note 87 at 11.
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c. Policiesfor revenue use
The Carbon Tax Act requires that revenue generated by the tax be used
to reduce other taxes and to fund a tax credit system, thus embodying a
revenue neutrality principle." The carbon tax revenue is used to reduce
the small business corporate income tax rate, the general corporate income
tax rate, and the two lowest provincial personal income tax rates by 5%.96
Importantly from the perspective of fairness, the carbon tax's revenue is
also used to fund a low-income tax credit."
The "Low-income Climate Action Tax Credit" provided $100 for
adults and $30 for children ($100 for the first child in single-parent
families) in the tax's first year, phased-out above incomes of $30,000
for individuals and $35,000 for families. However, when the carbon tax
increased by 50% in 2009-10, the credit only increased by 5% bringing
it to $105 per adult and $31.50 per child. The 2009-2010 Budget reports
that the "Low Income Climate Action Tax Credit" will increase to $115.50
per adult, and $34.50 for each child, effective 1 July 2011.98 This means
that the low-income tax credit will have increased by 15.5% over the first
five years of the tax, while the rate of the carbon tax itself increased by
150%.99
The government has financed a few additional measures from carbon
tax revenues in subsequent budgets. For instance, in 2009 the government
announced the creation of a "Northern and Rural Homeowner Benefit" of
up to $200 for homeowners outside of the major urban areas. 00 Beginning
in the 2011 tax year, this credit is additional to an existing homeowner
95. According to the "Green Blog" of the New York Times, the BC government had projected $1.85
billion in revenue for the first three years, though this figure will likely be reduced with falling oil
prices and the recession: John Lorinc, "British Columbia's Carbon Tax Survives," The New York
Times (14 May 2006), online: The New York Times <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/
british-columbias-carbon-tax-survives/>. Since the implementation of the British Columbia Carbon
Tax on 1July 2008, the provincial government reports the tax has generated $848 million in revenue.
For the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the budget reports a revised forecast amount of $542 million in revenue
derived from the British Columbia carbon tax. Revenue from the 2008-2009 fiscal year was $306
million. The budget also projects that the 2010-2011 fiscal year will produce $727 million in carbon
tax revenue. 2011-2012 fiscal year will generate $928 million and 2012-2013 fiscal year is estimated
to return $1,137 million, supra note 94 at 105-106. Ministry of Finance, "Myths and Facts about the
Carbon Tax," online: BC <http://www.fin.gov.bc.ca/tbs/tp/climate/A6.htm>.
96. See British Columbia, Carbon Tax, online: BC <http://www.gov.bc.ca/yourbc/carbon-tax/ct
planet.html?src=/planet/ctplanet.html>.
97. This credit was paid in June 2008. The government paid a one-time climate action dividend
payment of$100 to every resident of the province in the first year of the tax, but this was not financed
through carbon tax revenues.
98. BC FiscalPlan,supra note 94 at 106.
99. Lee, "Fair and Effective," supranote 86 at 16.
100. British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, Budget and FiscalPlan 2010/11-2012/13 (17 February
2009), online: BC <http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2009/bfp/2009_Budget.Fiscal_Pan.pdf'- at 73.
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grant.'o' Because First Nations on reserve do not collect carbon taxes, the
First Nations Tax Commission has expressed concern that they do not
have an existing fund with which to finance provision of the grant. 102
The government has also financed, effective February 2011, a new
credit for biomethane from carbon tax revenues. Biomethane is a carbon
neutral renewable fuel produced from biomass. The measure exempts
biomethane from payment of the carbon tax. When biomethane is blended
with a taxable fuel, the biomethane proportion of the blend is exempted
from the tax when actual proportion of biomethane is known. The credit
is equal to the carbon tax payable on the specified volume or percentage
of biomethane. 03 Finally, the government has also issued rebates up to
100% of carbon tax paid to local governments and school boards for being
carbon neutral by

2.

2 0 12

.11

Cost implications

a. Direct and indirect costs
The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) reports that $200
was paid in carbon taxes per household on average in 2010.105 An earlier
study by-the CCPA estimated that when the tax rate rises to $30 per tonne
of CO 2 e in 2012, fuel costs will rise to an estimated $760 per household
annually. 06
b. Regressive impacts
It is not surprising that direct and indirect cost increases represent a
greater financial burden on people with lower average incomes. The
CCPA estimates that in 2010 the carbon tax represented 1.3% of income
for households in the lowest decile as compared to 0.3% of income for
households in the top decile.17 In 2012 the regressivity increases, with the

101. British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, Home Owner Grant, online: BC <http://www.sbr.gov.
bc.ca/individuals/Property Taxes/HomeOwner Grant/basic hog.htn>.
102. First Nations Tax Commission, Information Bulletin: BC Carbon Tax Reduction Measures and
Impact on FirstNation Property Tax (15 March 2011), online: FNTC <http://173.236.209.42/media/
FNTC%201nfo%2OBulletin%20-%202011%20Carbon%2OTax%20in%20BC 2011%2003%2015.
pdf>.
103. British Columbia, Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan-2011/12 to 2013/14 (3 May
2011), online: BC <http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2011/bfp/2011 BudgetFiscalPlan.pdf> at 42.
104. British Columbia, Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development, Climate Action
Revenue Incentive Program, online: BC <http://www.cscd.gov.bc.ca/1gd/greencommunities/carip.
htm>.
105. Lee, "Fair and Effective," supranote 86 at 17.
106. Lee & Sanger, supranote 9 at 6. This includes direct and indirect costs.
107. Lee, "Fair and Effective," supra note 86 at 17.
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carbon tax representing 1.8% of income for the lowest decile and 0.45%
for the highest decile. os
The average income for Aboriginal Canadians is lower than for
non-Aboriginals. Nationally, Aboriginal people had a median income
of $18,962 in 2006, as compared to a median income of $27,097 in the
non-Aboriginal population.' 09 This trend of lower incomes for Aboriginal
people is applicable in BC as well.'"0
Because they are disproportionately represented in lower income
categories, Indigenous people in BC bear a greater proportion of a carbon
tax's regressivity, absent appropriate mitigation policies. It is important to
note that First Nations living on reserve do not have to pay the carbon tax
on fuel sold on the reserve. This certainly reduces the cost of the carbon
taxes for these First Nations. It does not address the indirect costs of the
tax, such as higher prices of foods or other goods and services that have an
intensive carbon component to their production. The exemption also does
not help indigenous communities living off reserve.
c.

Socio-economic/culturalchallenges ofadapting to increasedcosts

i.

Remoteness

Indigenous peoples live in different parts of British Columbia. It is estimated
that 62% of First Nations live off reserve in BC."' The 2006 Canadian
Census found that 76% of the off-reserve First Nations populations lived
in urban areas. Of this off-reserve population, 47% lived in metropolitan
centres, 3 1% in small urban centres, and 21% in rural areas. It is difficult
to offer any reliable commentary about remoteness for the off-reserve
populations.
Remoteness is a factor for the approximately 50% of Indigenous
peoples that live on reserves or in rural settlements off-reserve. There are
approximately 1600 First Nations reserves in British Columbia; forty-five
of these reserves are located within municipal boundaries and another

108. Ibid at 19.
109. Daniel Wilson & David Macdonald, The Income Gap between Aboriginals and the Rest
of Canada (2010), online: CCPA <http://www.policyalernatives.calsites/default/files/uploads/
publications/reports/docs/Aboriginal%201ncome%20Gap.pdf'> at 3.
110. British Columbia, Earnings Profile ofAboriginalPeoples-2006British Columbia in BC Stats,
online: BC Stats <http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/data/cen0I/abor/aborbc.pdf> at 14.
Ill. Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada in 2006: Inuit, Metis and First Nations,
2006 Census (2008), online: Statistics Canada <http://wwwl2.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/
as-sa/97-558/pdf/97-558-XIE2006001.pdf> at 42 [2006 Census]. The 2006 Aboriginal Census
documented that 40% of First Nations lived on-reserve, and of that group 98% were status Indians.
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thirty are immediately adjacent to a municipality." 2 The vast majority,
however, are located in remote areas, often far from urban centres."
The question ofremoteness is relevant when considering a community's
dependence on energy-intensive goods and services and transportation.
Statistics Canada has documented cost of living trends generally in
rural areas of Canada. In one report, the price of transporting goods to
rural locations was found to have declined due to greater efficiency in
trans-shipment by truck and rail. In contrast, the price of air transport
of cargo and people to rural regions has increased in the past decade.' 14
Telecommunication technology has decreased the cost of communication
services for rural areas; however, the price of transporting people by either
public, e.g., plane, train, bus, or private mode, e.g., motor vehicle, relative
to the overall trend of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has translated
into higher costs for travelling to rural locations. This increased cost is
tied to higher gasoline prices and the higher costs to insure a vehicle."'
Indigenous communities living in remote areas are dependent on private
transportation options to access services such as schools, medical care,
and shopping, which are often located long distances away. As energy
costs rise, the impact upon remotely located communities will be greater
than those located in urban areas given the former's greater dependency on
private transportation and the longer distances they must travel. Remote
communities also have access to fewer alternatives to goods and services
whose costs rise due to rising energy prices.
In 2007, British Columbians spent approximately 13% of their gross
income on transportation, or an average of $9,896 per household."'6
As illustrated below, however, rural households tend to spend more on
transportation than urban counterparts due to factors such as greater
travelling distances and higher reliance on private modes of transport.
Many Indigenous Canadians must contend with these greater relative

112. BC Assessment, Assessment Servicesfor FirstNations, online: BC <http://www.bcassessment.
ca/govt/local-govemment/Pages/AssessmentServicesforFirst Nations.aspx>.
113. See this federal government map, which locates First Nations reserves and settlements in BC:
Natural Resources Canada, The Atlas of Canada-Canada--Indianand Inuit Communities-British
Columbia (1984), online: Canada <http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/auth/english/maps/archives/reference/
indian inuit/mcr_4029>. This second map shows the territory of British Columbia as it is divided
among First Nations: First Nations, Land Rights and Environmentalism in BC, online: <http://www.
firstnations.de/img/0 I -0-first-nationsjpg>.
114. Ray D Bollman, FactorsDriving Canada t Rural Economy: 1914-2006(2007), online: Statistics
Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-601 -m/21-601 -m2007083-eng.pdf> 7-13.
115. Ibid.
116. Statistics Canada, "Income, Pensions, Spending and Wealth" in Canada Year Book 2009 (2009),
online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/l1-402-x/2009000/pdflincome-revenu-eng.
pdf> 215 at 230.
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transportation cost increases given their often rural location. While the
2006 census documented an increase in the percentage of Indigenous
peoples living in an urban area to 54%, there is still a large number in
rural areas, mostly living on-reserve."' The 2001 US "National Household
Travel Survey" (which includes both work and non-work travel) suggests
that the vehicle is essential to mobility in rural areas, regardless of income
levels."' The survey demonstrated that all income, race, and age groups in
rural areas are almost entirely dependent on cars for travelling purposes,
and that there is not much difference between the use of cars by lower
income and high income households." 9 This means that lower income
groups in rural areas bear a greater relative burden to cover the cost of
transportation and gasoline.
Communities living in remote areas of BC depend on traditional
means of subsistence, including hunting and fishing. Increases in the costs
of food could put more pressure on hunting and fishing for food, which,
in combination with potential climate change impacts, could impact the
natural resources upon which they depend.
Another factor to consider is that remote tourism could decrease, as
aviation and boating costs increase. To the extent that remote communities
in British Columbia rely on this form of tourism for income, rising energy
prices could have a disproportionate impact. The Aboriginal Cultural
Tourism Blueprint Strategy for British Columbia published in 2005 by
the Aboriginal Tourism Association of British Columbia (ATBC), found
that 31% of Indigenous tourism products in 2003 were adventure tourism
products such as guided tours, river rafting, golf courses, hiking trails, and
horseback riding. Tourism was defined as tourism owned by or involving
Aboriginal peoples, typically focusing on the relationship between
heritage, history, values, land, lifestyle, entertainment, and art.120
The Haida Gwaii area, as an example of a remote British Columbia
region, and its First Nation have been studied for their vulnerability,
adaptive capacity, and resiliency against climate change. The communities
of Haida Gwaii are highly dependent on natural resource employment,
an industry highly susceptible to climate change impacts. This region
117. 2006 Census, supra note Ill at 12.
118. John Puchner & John Renne, "Urban-Rural Differences in Mobility and Mode Choice: Evidence
from the 2001 NHTS" (2004), online: Victoria Transport Policy Institute <http://www.vtpi.org/
pucher ur.pdf> at 8. For instance, only 11% of poor rural households have no vehicle as compared to
27% of poor urban households (falling below an annual income of $20,000).
119. Ibid at 11.
120. Aboriginal Tourism Association of British Columbia, Aboriginal Cultural Tourism Blueprint
Strategy for British Columbia (November 2005), online: ATBC <http://www.aboriginalbc.com/
Corporate/Info/atbc blueprint strategy full-report.pdf> at 3, 6.
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is populated primarily by First Nations although there is also a strong
military presence.12 In 2003, the largest employment sector was natural
resources (29% of the population), followed by the service sector at
7%, which was highly dependent on tourism. The challenge of seasonal
employment in this region will certainly be further aggravated by climate
change.12 2 In light of Haida Gwaii's reliance on ecological and cultural
tourism, increased prices for fossil fuels will constrain revenues from
tourism. In a report on land use planning by the British Columbia Ministry
of Sustainable Resource Management, the recorded distribution of visitor
activities in Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve in 1997 was 41%
kayaking, 28% powerboating, 20% sailboating, 7% air transport combined
with. power-boating, 2% kayak mothershipping, with 2% categorized as
"other." 23 This remote community has 20 to 30 businesses licensed to
operate commercial air or boat trips in Gwaii Haanas. This case study was
directed at providing information on the impact of global warming on the
region's economy. It also provides useful information on the community's
reliance on fossil fuel to earn income in tourism by attracting visitors for
adventure sport. Increased costs for fuel could adversely impact business
in tourism, an important job sector for remote communities.
ii. Housing
The type and quality of housing can influence how carbon pricing policies
will impact a given family. For instance, people living in poor quality
housing are more vulnerable to damage from extreme weather events.
According to the 2006 census, Aboriginal people across all metropolitan
areas were two to three times more likely than the non-Aboriginal
population to live in dwellings needing major repairs.124 Census statistics
for BC document 32.4% of on-reserve Aboriginal housing requiring
minor repairs and 36.5% requiring major repairs. Off-reserve, 32.3% of
Aboriginal housing required minor repairs and 13.5% required major

121. Teresa Ann Conner, "Social Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change Impacts:
Identifying Attributes in Two Remote Coastal Communities on Haida Gwaii, British Columbia" (MA
Thesis, University of Victoria Geography Faculty, 2005) [unpublished] at 78-79.
122. Ibid at 90-91.
123. Land Use Plan Process Management Team, BackgroundReport: Haida Gwaii/Queen Charlotte
Island Land Use Plan(Victoria: Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management, 2003), online: British
Columbia <http://archive.ilmb.gov.bc.calslrp/Irmp/nanaimo/haidagwaii/docs/HGQCI Background
Report.pdf> at 151.
124. 2006 Census, supra note 111 at 16.
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repairs. For non-Aboriginal households in BC, 24.5% required minor
repairs and 6.8% were in need of major repairs.125
Another factor to consider is that of home ownership. Income levels
will certainly influence the ability of home-owners to make necessary
changes; however, whether one is a home-owner or a renter will also
influence the ability of the person to make the changes. Climate change
mitigation policies that are directed at refurbishing buildings to improve
energy efficiency or incentives for installing better insulation or purchasing
energy efficient appliances may simply not be accessible to tenants who
are most often subject to the decision-making of their landlords with
respect to property improvements.
According to the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation
(CMHC), 43% of Aboriginal people in BC are renters.126 This is a greater
proportion of renters than in the non-Aboriginal population. The Royal
Commission Report on Aboriginal Peoples compared non-Aboriginal
Canadian and Aboriginal housing indicators. The percentage of Canadians
living in tenant-occupied dwellings was measured at 37.10%, as compared
to 48.70% of the Aboriginal population, not including those Aboriginals
living in band-owned housing. To the extent that these tenants are
constrained in their ability to react to increased energy prices or access
incentive programs, the policies may be unfair. As elaborated in the
Discussion section, attention can be paid to these factors in order to
design mitigation policies that are broadly available and, where this is not
possible, create targeted policies to offset any disproportionate impact.
A final factor to consider in the context of housing is the issue of
overcrowding. Overcrowding in homes can lead to a variety of health
and safety problems. While the connection to climate change is not direct,
the need for renovations or improvement of housing infrastructure to
accommodate larger numbers depends on financial resources; increased
costs for home construction and maintenance could impede progress
on addressing overcrowding problems. In a CCPA report on housing in

125. BC Stats, British Columbia Statistical Profile ofAboriginalPeoples 2006: Aboriginal Peoples
Comparedto the Non-Aboriginal Populationwith Emphasis on Labour Market and Post Secondary
Issues (2006), online: British Columbia <http://www.bestats.gov.bc.ca/StatisticsBySubject/
AboriginalPeoples/CensusProfiles/2006census.aspx> at 13 [StatisticalProfile20061.
126. The CMHC defines an Aboriginal household as "any household in which at least one spouse,
common-law partner, or lone parent self-identified as Aboriginal, or at least 50 per cent of household
members self-identified as Aboriginal. If any member of the family household identified as Indian
(Status or Non-Status), Mtis, or Inuit, then the household is classified accordingly." CMHC,
Aboriginal Households in Canada,by Aboriginal Identity, Location and Tenure, Canada,Provinces
and Territories, 2006 (2006), online: CMHC <http://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/en/corp/about/cahoob/
data/data 014.cfm>.
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Canada, it was found that both urban Aboriginal groups and Aboriginal
groups on reserves often live in overcrowded households.'27
iii. Employment in impacted sectors
The impacts of climate change will be felt throughout the BC economy.
However, some sectors are more vulnerable to changes in climate and
climate. change mitigation policies. A report for the Business Council
of British Columbia identified the following sectors as those that will
incur the greatest impacts in BC: forestry, the energy sector, mining and
smelting, agriculture, fisheries, transportation, and tourism / recreation.'28
While Aboriginal people work in all industries of the economy, they
are more highly represented in certain sectors. They are two times more
likely to be employed in the natural resources sector and two times less
likely to be employed in professional, scientific, technical, financial, and
insurance sectors than non-Aboriginals.129 In the 10 provinces, 7% of offreserve Aboriginals between the ages of 25 and 54 years were part of the
natural resources labour force, as compared to an estimated 4% of the nonAboriginal population in 2007.130
A Statistics Canada report determined that Aboriginals off-reserve
experienced a greater loss in employment from the economic recession in
comparison to the non-Aboriginal population. The Aboriginal employment
rate dropped 3.2%, where non-Aboriginals experienced a drop of 1.9%.
The study found this trend was most pronounced in BC and Alberta,
with a major loss in employment for Aboriginals in the manufacturing
sector of 30% as opposed to 8% for non-Aboriginals. The same trend
was documented in construction with a 16% drop as compared to a 5%
decline in employment for non-Aboriginals.' 3 ' In the core age group of
comparison for this study (25 to 54 yrs), British Columbia had the greatest
decline in employment rate: 5.6% to 65.1%.132 The unemployment rate
127. Andrew Jackson, Home Truths: Why the Housing System Matters to All Canadians(Ottawa:

CCPA, 2004) at 56.
128. Nancy Olewiler, supra note 32 at 3.
129. Dominique P6russe, Aboriginal People Living Off-reserve and the Labour Market: Estimates
form the Labour Force Survey, 2007 (2007), online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.cal
pub/71-588-x/71-588-x200800 1-eng.pdf> at 13.
130. Ibid at 14. In the British Columbia natural resources sector, which includes forestry, wood, paper
manufacturing as well as other primary industries (agriculture, fishing, trapping, and mining), onreserve Aboriginals form 18% of the experienced labour force, while off-reserve Aboriginals form
10.8% of the natural resources labour force. In comparison, non-Aboriginals form 6.6 % of the
experienced labour force in this sector. StatisticalProfile 2006, supra note at 13.
13 1. Carly Weeks, "Natives Bore Brunt of Job Losses in Canada, Statscan Study Shows" The Globe
and Mail (13 May 2010), online: Immigration Watch Canada <http://www.immigrationwatchcanada.
org/2010/05/14/natives-bore-brunt-of-job-issues-in-canada-statscan-study-shows/>.
132. StatisticalProfile 2006, supra note 125 at 13.
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increase was also substantial in BC, rising 4 percentage points to 14.4%.
The Metis in BC experienced the greatest drop in employment rate of
13.6%, which is the lowest employment rate of M6tis in any province or
region in Canada.'33
These statistics suggest that Aboriginal people may bear a
disproportionate impact of employment losses in impacted sectors due
to climate change (both its impacts and the impacts of policies, such as
carbon pricing). It is, however, difficult to draw generalized conclusions
as employment in other sectors, such as renewable energy, could increase
and we do not have data about the rate of employment of indigenous
people in these sectors. The main point is that policy makers should aim
to understand these impacts and select and design policies in a way that
mitigates potentially unfair impacts on vulnerable groups.
3. Impact of complementary policies
a. Policies regardinguse of revenue
Having considered the cost implications of the carbon tax, we now consider,
from a fairness perspective, the impact of the various policies for how the
revenue is to be used, considering in particular how the policies impact
upon Aboriginal communities.
In contrast to Qu6bec's modest redevance annuelle, BC's carbon tax
revenues are not directed towards climate change mitigation or adaptation
strategies.13 4 Rather, British Columbia promised to return all of the
revenue raised by the measure to taxpayers in the form of tax reductions
and credits. The government believed this "revenue-neutral" approach
to be essential in garnering adequate public support for the measure. In
fact, they probably believed this to be a way to increase the measure's
appearance of "fairness" since it produces what economists have identified

133. Ibid at 14.
134. Rfglement stir la redevance annuellepayable a la Rigie des telecommunications du Quebec par
une socidti exploitante, RQ, c R-8.0 1, r 1.1.
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as a "double dividend."' However, when examined more closely, the tax
shifting approach may not adequately take into account the perspective
of vulnerable communities, since the tax cuts created by tax shifting may
themselves be regressive and /or may not be accessible to certain groups.136
A 2008 CCPA study evaluated the impacts of the tax reductions that
are part of the carbon tax policy and found them to be regressive. For
instance, in 2010-11 the personal income tax cuts produce $562 for the
top 20% of earners versus $5 for the bottom 20%.'" In addition to their
regressive impacts, these tax cuts are not equally accessible to Aboriginal
versus non-Aboriginal people by the simple fact that indigenous people
often do not earn enough income to pay income taxes in the first place. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the complex income tax policies
applicable to Aboriginal people in Canada. We can, however, state with
confidence that Aboriginal people are disproportionately represented in
low income categories, so it follows that the double burden of regressivity
described earlier will apply to the tax cuts as it did in the case of the costs
of the carbon tax.
Revenue from the carbon tax is also used to create the "Low Income
Climate Action Tax Credit," which is targeted at individuals (rather than
households) and is refundable. Making the credit refundable ensures the
credit is available irrespective of income. Since Aboriginal peoples often
do not have any enough income to pay taxes, this feature ensures they still
have access to the credit, thus bolstering the measure's fairness. In addition,
the CCPA study shows that the credit created a net positive benefit for low135. The double dividend hypothesis is based on the premise that income taxes tend to "distort"
economic behaviour (for example, taxes on labour discourage work effort; taxes on savings reduce
capital). See Richard D Morgenstern, "Environmental Taxes: Is There a Double Dividend?" (1996)
38:3 Environment 16 at 16. The double dividend is said to arise when environmental taxes are used
to address an environmental problem (producing an environmental benefit-the first dividend) and
the revenue is used to reduce distortionary taxes (producing the benefit of reducing distortions on
work effort and efficiency-the second dividend). There are various critiques of the hypothesis. See,
for example, Don Fullerton & Gilbert E Metcalfe, "Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend
Hypothesis-Did you Really Expect Something for Nothing?" (1998) 73:1 Chicago-Kent L Rev 221256. However, the majority of economists accept the "weak" double dividend theory which posits that:
"revenue recycling through cuts in distortionary taxes improves welfare relative to recycling through
lump-sum payments"; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Political
Economy ofEnvironmentally Related Taxes (Paris: OECD, 2006) at 12.
136. See, for example, Kathleen Lahey's critique of reductions in income tax for women on the basis
that they are not equally accessible to women and since these reductions may impact an important
tax base for social programs of benefit to women. Kathleen A Lahey, "What About Women? Gender
Analysis of Discussion Paper on New Brunswick's Tax System," New Brunswick Advisory Council
on the Status of Women (31 July 2008), online: ACSWCCCF <http://76.12.152.213/media/arsw/riles/
documents/What%20About%2OWomen.pdf>.
137. Ibid at 13. The corporate tax cuts have a similarly regressive outcome, producing $603 for the
top quintile and $28 for the bottom quintile.
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income families in its first year, meaning that these families receive more
in credits than they pay in the tax.' Arguably, this overall net benefit
compensates for the regressivity of the personal and corporate tax cuts.
However, this progressivity is lost after the first year, as the credit is not
scheduled to rise in line with the carbon tax rate. Taking into account the
Low Income Tax Credit discussed above, the CCPA study showed that the
policy package as a whole produced a regressive outcome in 2010-11,
with a $311 net benefit for the top 20% of households compared to $47 net
loss for bottom 20% of households. 13 9
What would it take to create a fair carbon tax policy? We argue that
a singular emphasis on tax-shifting may be misguided. While returning
carbon tax revenues to taxpayers through various policies is fine, we
argue that the apportionment of those revenues should take into account
the impacts on vulnerable groups. While the refundable low-income tax
credit is very important to address regressivity and should be expanded
to cover the full increases in the tax, 14 0 the government could further
increase the measure's fairness by including policies that promote social
justice for communities that are particularly vulnerable to climate change.
Designing these policies would require further analysis to identify specific
vulnerabilities and target policies appropriately. For instance, our case
study suggested that Aboriginal groups may be more vulnerable to job
losses in heavily impacted sectors. Policies that invest in job-training and
promote transition strategies for these communities could help address
disproportionate impacts.
Fairness must be a factor in the choice of allocating revenues from
carbon tax revenues to be sure that the spending policies do not contribute
to the already greater vulnerability to climate change of marginalized
communities. Rather, revenues should be devoted to ensuring that these
communities are not disproportionately impacted by carbon pricing
policies.
In sum, how does the province's choice with respect to revenue-use
impact upon Aboriginal communities in BC? Certainly, the creation of
a low-income tax credit to offset distributional impacts for low-income
families is important; however, as the CCPA study concludes, the province
needs to ensure that the amount of the credit rises concomitant with the tax
138. See Lee & Sanger, supra note 9 at 9.
139. Ibid.
140. With respect to feasibility, one could point to the fact that the low-income credit has shrunk from
representing one-third of revenues in 2008-09 to 19% in 2010-11, to 12% by 2012-13. See Lee, "Fair
and Effective", supra note 86 at 5. In other words, it is a question of political priority rather than lack
of revenue available.
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rate after the first year. The corporate and income tax cuts disproportionately
benefit non-Aboriginal people. Instead of using revenues to fund these tax
cuts, the province could have used the revenue in ways that helped address
climate change and promoted social justice. Investing the funds in climate
change projects such as public transit and promoting energy efficiency in
public buildings and residences would yield environmental benefits.
b. Exemptions and other mitigationpolicies
The BC Climate Action Plan includes a wide variety of measures aimed
at climate change mitigation and adaptation. To the extent that Aboriginal
communities are particularly vulnerable to climate change, investments in
climate change mitigation and adaptation would promote social justice.
The province could do even more by directing funds into climate change
projects that are in line with Aboriginal communities' priorities, such as
strategies to address vulnerabilities in forestry, fisheries, and tourism.
Public investments into programs such as these could have benefits for
the climate, along with important social benefits. We have not evaluated
the measures in the Climate ChangeAction Plan outside of the carbon tax
though we believe that it would be a worthwhile undertaking that would
allow for a more fulsome assessment of how the impacts of climate change
(and the burdens and benefits of its corresponding policies) are distributed
among various segments of society.
B. Emissions tradingin Australia
The debate about instrument choice is well illustrated by Australia's
numerous changes of direction about the appropriate carbon pricing
policy. 141On 8 November 2011, Australia passed legislation introducing a
carbon tax to begin 1 July 2012 which will transition to an ETS on 1 July
2015. The legislation describes the carbon pricing policy as comprising
a fixed price period for three years from 1 July 2012, transitioning to a
flexible price period from I July 2015. We have some details of the ETS
that will begin on 1 July 2015, but not all. For this reason, we will use the
design features of the ETS as known from the current legislation and we
will assume other design features taken from the former CarbonPollution
Reduction Scheme (CPRS).

141. For instance, in 2008, Australia had designed an ETS known as the CarbonPollution Reduction
Scheme (CPRS). The legislation which would have introduced the ETS to Australia beginning from
July 2011 was blocked by the opposition and then shelved by the prime minister in April 2010.
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1. Design of the ETS
a. Scope
Most of Australia's emissions come from electricity generation, transport,
and agriculture. The ETS from 2015 will cover stationary emissions,
fugitive emissions (other than from decommissioned coal mines), industrial
processes, and waste emissions and will include four of the six greenhouse
gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and perfluorocarbons from
aluminium smelting. 4 2 Coverage is based on an exception basis and will
include scope 1 emissions released into the atmosphere as a direct result of
the operation of the facility within Australia unless expressly exempted.143
Exemptions include agriculture and emissions from combustible biofuels
and biomass, including combustion of methane from landfill, emissions
from land clearing, and forestry.'" The ETS will place obligations on
facilities that emit more than 25,000 tonnes CO 2 e per annum and certain
landfill facilities that emit 10,000 tonnes CO 2e per annum,' 4 5 which
amounts to approximately 500 Australian companies and will cover 65%
of Australia's emissions.14 6 Households and light commercial vehicles will
not face a carbon price on the fuel they use for transport. Agriculture,
fishing, and forestry industries will not pay a carbon price for the fuel they
use.147 Other business transport emissions will be subject to an equivalent
carbon price imposed through changes in fuel tax credits or changes in
excise and these large users of fuel can opt-in to the scheme.148
b. Rate
The short-term reduction target is 5% of 2000 levels by 2020, with a longterm target of 80% reduction by 2050. 149 A national scheme cap will to be
set for each year by the independent Climate Change Authority from 2015,
and carbon units equal to that cap will be issued or auctioned. Because
of the large number of free permits planned to be allocated to emissions
intensive, trade-exposed industries, there will be less revenue raised
142. Clean Energy Bill, supra note 75, ss 30(11) and (12). The remaining greenhouse gases will not
be covered by the carbon pricing mechanism, but will be subject to an equivalent carbon price using
existing import and manufacturing levies under the Ozone ProtectionandSynthetic GHG Management
Act.
143. Ibid, s 30(l).
144. Ibid, s 30.
145. Ibid, s 32.
146. Australia Government, Securing a Clean Energy Future: The AustralianGovernment's Climate
Change Plan, online: Australia <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/
Consolidated-Final.pdf> at 27.
147. Ibid at 29.
148. Clean Energy Bill, supra note 75, ss 92A-G.
149. Ibid, s 3. See also, Securing a Clean Energy Future,supranote 145 at xi.
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initially than if all allocations were auctioned.1 0 In the fixed price period,
the price of the carbon units will be $23/tonne, increasing each year by
2.5% to $25.40 in 2014.1'1 For the first three years of the ETS there will
be a price ceiling set at $20 above the international price and will rise by
5% in real terms each year. The price floor will start at $15 and rise at 4%
52
in real terms each year.1
c. Policiesfor revenue use
The government has committed to using the revenue generated by the ETS
to assist Australian households and businesses'53 to adjust to the scheme
through direct cash assistance and tax offsets. More than half the revenue
raised will go to assist households. 5 4 All increases will be permanent
and will increase over time.'15 There will be increases in social security
benefits, allowances, and pensions to compensate for the anticipated
increases.' 6 These include lump sum clean energy advances payable to
people in receipt of social security payments before the commencement
of the carbon pricing scheme. Following this payment, there will be clean
energy supplement payments to keep in line with consumer price index
increases due to the carbon price.'"5 Taxpayers with an annual income less
than $80,000 will receive tax cuts of at least $300 per year.'15 The tax free
threshold is to increase from $6000 to $18,200 in 2012 and increase again

150. The Australian government will allocate free AEU's to the most emissions intensive trade
exposed (EITE) activities in various industries. Industries that have emissions intensity between
1000-1999 tonnes of CO 2e per million dollars of revenue, or between 3000-5999 tonnes of COe per
million dollars of value added in the specified assessment period will receive permits for 66% of their
baseline emissions. Those who have emissions intensity above 2000 tonnes of CO 2e / million dollars
of revenue or above 6000 tonnes of CO 2e per million dollar value added in the assessment period
will receive permits for 94.5% of their baseline emissions. This rate of assistance will be reduced at
a rate of 1.3% per year (which is the carbon productivity contribution) to encourage EITE industries
to contribute to national carbon reduction. When similar obligations are placed on competitors, either
through domestic action or an international agreement, this assistance will cease.
151. Clean Energy Bill, supra note 75, s 100.
152. Ibid, ss100 & I11.
153. About 40% of carbon price revenue will be allocated to help businesses and support jobs:
Securinga CleanFuture, supranote 145 at xv.
154. Australian Government, Clean Energy Future: Supporting Australian Households, online:
Australia <http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/supporting-australianhouseholds.pdf>.
155. Securing a Clean Future,supranote 146 at 39.
156. This household assistance will provide higher payments, equivalent to a 1.7% increase, to
pensioners, veterans, self-funded retirees, and families. This bill also establishes new supplements
for low-income families, single income families, and certain households that have significantly
higher than average electricity costs due to a medical condition, ageing, or disability: Clean Energy
(HouseholdAssistance Amendments) Bill 2011 (Cth).
157. Ibid.
158. Supra note 154.
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to $19,400 in 2015.1'5 There is also the availability of an annual income
supplement of $300.160
2. Cost implications
a. Direct and indirectcosts
Under Australia's ETS, goods and services that are carbon intensive will
cost more over time than goods that are not. It has been recognised by the
government that the price of consumer goods will increase.'"' The overall
impact of the scheme on an individual household's welfare will depend
on factors including household consumption patterns and the ability of
households to adjust consumption patterns in response to higher carbon
prices. We argue that the most vulnerable in our communities will be less
able to adjust their consumption patterns; for example, they may not be
able to afford to expend the upfront costs of buying more energy efficient
appliances. In remote areas, the increased cost of transport as a result of
carbon pricing will increase the cost of food even more than for those
in urban areas and there may be less opportunity for those in remote
communities to have the choice to change their consumption patterns to
less energy intensive food products.
The ETS will increase energy and fuel prices, which will in turn
impact a variety of products and services. The government estimated the
cost of living increases from the ETS with a $23 carbon price for 2012-13
at 0.7% rising to 0.9% with the introduction of the ETS in 2015-2016.162
Electricity prices are predicted to rise by $3.30 per week and gas by $1.50
per week, with food rising by $0.80, making a total of $9.9061; these
increases will be felt more strongly by low income households.
b. Regressive impacts
The estimated price increases from the ETS will impact groups differently
based on their income levels. In 2008, the median household weekly
income for indigenous people was $445. This compares to $746 for nonindigenous households. '"Indigenous Australians are disproportionately

159. Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Joint Media Release, "Household
assistance to flow under clean energy legislation" (8 November 2011), online: Australia <http://www.
climatechange.gov.au/minister/greg-combet/201 1/media-releases/November/mr2O111108b.aspx>.
160. lbid.
161. Modelling, supranote 68.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid.
164. Productivity Commission Report, supra note 22 at ch 4.9.

166 The Dalhousie Law Journal
represented amongst Australia's low income households.' 5 They are
more than twice as likely as other Australians to be in the lowest income
quintile and almost four times less likely to be in the highest quintile.'66
The measure of financial stress, or the poverty indicator, is a household's
ability to raise $2,000 within a week of an emergency.167 Comparing
the 2008 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey
(NATSISS) and the 2006 General Social Survey, 47% of the indigenous
population was under financial stress. This compared to 13% for the nonindigenous population. It is clear that indigenous communities, which are
disproportionately represented in low-income groups, may experience
greater hardship than non-indigenous communities in the face of direct
and indirect price increases due to the ETS. We describe this as a double
burden of regressivity.
c. Socio-economic/culturalchallenges ofadapting to increasedcosts
In addition to having less income, socio-economic and cultural factors
unique to indigenous groups can influence the impact of price increases
due to an ETS. Here, we discuss remoteness, housing and employment in
impacted sectors.
i. Remoteness
The poverty indicator increases dramatically in remote communities
and this will be exacerbated by the increased costs pursuant to a carbon
price. The financial stress of indigenous Australians in remote areas
is approximately 64%.161 That is, approximately 64% of indigenous
Australians living in remote areas fall within this poverty indicator and
45% of the population of very remote Australia is indigenous. Putting this
in proportion, the population of remote and very remote areas is made
up of 25% of the indigenous population and 2% of the non-indigenous

population.169
Living remotely may also make it more difficult to adjust consumption
patterns to cope with increased costs because of the limited access to

165. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4713.0 PopulationCharacteristics,Aboriginaland TorresStrait
Islander Australians 2006 (4 May 2010), online: ABS <http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@nsf/
mf/4713.0> [4713.0 Population].
166. Ibid.
167. This measure is an ABS indicator, introduced in the 2001 Census and expanded in the
2008 NATSISS. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4714.0 - National Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Social Survey, 2008 (2008), online: ABS <http://www.abs.gov.aulausstats/abs@.nsf/
Latestproducts/4714.OMain%20Featuresl 12008?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno-4714
.0&issue=2008&num=&view->.
168. This is based on the poverty indicator: see ibid.
169. 4704.0 Health and Welfare, supra note 19.
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alternatives. Fuel prices, for example, will increase as a result of an ETS.
This will have a more pronounced impact on the cost of food in remote
locations than in urban areas due to additional transport costs. Many
indigenous groups living remotely rely on customary ways of living, such
as fishing and hunting and these increases in the cost of food may put
more pressure on the "hybrid" economy of hunting and fishing.o70 If the
hybrid economy diminishes, this will shift consumption patterns towards
non-traditional sources of food, resulting in an increased cost burden. This
could also lead to a more processed diet, making these communities more
susceptible to obesity, diabetes, and other health-related problems.17 ' This
loss may also have an impact on the commercial farming of native foods
and the use of native plants for arts and crafts industries.172
One way to minimize fuel costs is to use public transport, but the
ability to do so depends on the availability and proximity of public
transport services. Remote area indigenous communities are likely to be
dependent on private transport options, as public transport is usually not
available, and they may need to travel long distances to access services,
such as shopping, schooling, and medical care. 17 Another factor is that
reducing the use of private transport may keep costs down, but reducing
mobility may lead to isolation and social exclusion.
Tourism in remote areas1 7 4 may be impacted through increased costs
and longer term environmental degradation, especially those that rely
on currently vulnerable ecosystems, such as the Great Barrier Reef and
Kakadu. " A carbon price will apply to domestic aviation and shipping.7 6
If a similar price does not apply to international aviation and shipping this
could make domestic tourism less competitive compared to international
tourism and hurt the indigenous tourism market.

170. See Part II, Background and Context, above at 11.
171. Climate Action Network Australia, Climate Change Impacts in Australia, online: CANA<http://
www.cana.net.au/general-info/climate-change-impacts-australia>.
172. Ibid.
173. For a comparison with non-indigenous Australians, see supra note 22.
174. 600 indigenous rangers are employed around Australia, mostly in remote areas. See Working on
Country Scheme, online: Australia <http://www.environment.gov.au/indigenous/workingoncountry/
index.html>.
175. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Synthesis Report
states that: "Water security problems are projected to intensify by 2030 in southern and eastern
Australia. Significant loss of biodiversity is projected to occur by 2020 in some ecologically rich sites
including the Great Barrier Reef and Queensland Wet Tropics. Other sites at risk include Kakadu...":
online: IPCC <http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm>.
176. Supra note 146 at 29.
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ii. Housing
Low income earners are more vulnerable to climate change impacts
because they tend to live in more marginal areas and in poor quality
houses.'77 As discussed earlier, those living in poor quality housing with a
lack of connection to essential services may be more heavily impacted by
storm damage"' and, as the cost of repairs will increase through a carbon
price, this will be felt more acutely in remote indigenous communities.
Another issue with housing relates to home ownership. In 2006 a majority
of indigenous people (63%) aged 18 years or over were living in rented
dwellings.' 79 The proportion renting was lower in major cities and regional
areas (around 58%) than in remote areas (82%).so Overall, in 2006, only
35% of indigenous people aged 18 years and over lived in a home owner/
purchaser household.'"' Low home ownership rates limit the ability to take
up government incentives for climate change adaptation because renters
have less ability and no financial incentive to invest in capital energy
efficiency improvements, such as insulation.182 Regulations that required
landlords to insulate rental properties would improve energy efficiency
but this may result in a flow-on to increased rents. The impact on renters is
uncertain. Would they move to cheaper accommodation or simply be under
increased financial stress? As a high proportion of indigenous Australians
live in rental accommodation, 83 many do not have the opportunities to
invest in housing infrastructure to minimize climate change impacts.
Overcrowding, which is prevalent in remote and very remote areas,184
can also put stress on basic household facilities which may make them
more vulnerable to damage from climate events. Overcrowding is often
a result of inadequate, inappropriate, or poorly maintained housing stock.
This can have very serious health risks because if a house has sufficient
working taps, tubs, showers, toilets, insect screens, and protection from
the weather it will be much better able to prevent the disease transmission
that can occur in crowded households. In remote and very remote areas in
177. See Part II, Background and Context, above at 10.
178. Ibid.
179. 4713.0- PopulationCharacteristics,supra note 165 at Table 33.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. A recent Australian government initiative to install insulation sought to minimize energy costs
as they became less affordable as a result of the economic downturn, but renters would not be able to
take advantage of this and would only benefit if their landlords decided to take up this offer.
183. A higher proportion of Indigenous adults (68.8%) than non-Indigenous adults (28.6 per cent)
lived in either public, community or private rental housing: supranote 22 at ch 8.
184. In 2008, overcrowding rates for indigenous Australians were more than five times that of nonindigenous Australians and overcrowding was most common in very remote areas, where 58.2% of
Indigenous people lived in overcrowded households compared to 13.3% in urban areas: ibid at ch 9.
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particular, it is more expensive and logistically more difficult to construct
and maintain infrastructure. Pricing carbon will only increase construction
costs and this will disproportionately impact on these remote indigenous
communities that need to improve their housing infrastructure.
This has been recognized under the Clean Energy LegislativePackage
and the government has allocated $40m under the Remote Indigenous
Energy Program.185
iii. Employment in impacted sectors

People who work in industries that change due to climate change (and
its related mitigation policies) will also be impacted. For example, one
Australian study suggested that the industries that will be most affected by
a carbon price are those with a high emissions intensity, with access to few
substitutes, and with limited capacity to pass on the emissions price (those
with overseas competitors)."' Thus, in Australia the most vulnerable
sectors are coal-fired electricity production and agriculture, though natural
resources industries such as mining are also likely to be impacted.
The extent to which indigenous communities are affected by changes
in labour due to climate change depends on where they are employed.
Statistics from the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2006" show
that there was a higher percentage of total employment of indigenous
workers (as compared to non-indigenous workers) in the mining industry,
administration, safety and support services, education and training,
health care, and social assistance. It is not possible to draw conclusions
based on this data about the extent to which indigenous communities
may be impacted relative to non-indigenous communities. However, it
is something that should be considered when climate change mitigation
policies are created so that appropriate offsetting programs (such as
incentives to hire indigenous workers) can be created if needed to address
unfair impacts. A related consideration is that jobs will be created due to
climate change (i.e., in alternative energy technologies) and it would be
important to consider who is benefitting from these new jobs and how
to ensure that indigenous workers have fair access to new employment
opportunities.

185. Australian Indigenous Health Infonet, Remote Indigenous Energy Program,online: AlHI <http://
www.healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/key-resources/programs-projects?pid= 1123> [Remote Indigenous
Energy Program].
I 86. Ross Garnaut, Garnaut Climate Change Review-Final Report (September 2008), online:
Gamaut Review <http://www.garnautreview.org.au/index.htm>.
187. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 4713.0-PopulationCharacteristics,supra note 165 at "Table of
Contents."
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3. Impact of complementary policies
a. Policies regardingrevenue use
We have considered the cost implications of the ETS and described the
Australian government's policies for revenue use. We will now consider
the impact of these revenue use policies, with particular emphasis on how
fair they are to indigenous Australians. It needs to be recognised that there
is more uncertainty as to the amount of revenue generated from an ETS
than a tax, depending on the setting of the cap and the allocation of the
permits. This makes it more difficult for governments to apply funding
to mitigation policies. Of course, a government may choose to offer an
assistance package irrespective of revenues generated from an ETS. Such
an assistance program could be delivered through the tax system,'" in the
form of tax rebates to low income earners, or outside of the tax system. The
government has announced that more than half of the revenue raised will
go to assist households in the form of tax cuts.1 89 Like the CPRS, the Clean
Energy Legislative Package specifically attempts to avoid any regressive
impacts of the tax rebates,'" unlike the impacts of the tax rebates under the
BC carbon tax. 191 The government has attempted to minimise the regressive
impacts of the policy with tax cuts focusing on lower income households.
The government has stated that 90% of low income households will
receive assistance that exceeds their predicted impact of the carbon price
by 20%.192 This is a recognition of the distributional impacts of a carbon
price but these tax cuts may not be equally accessible to indigenous and
non-indigenous Australians by virtue of the fact that indigenous people
often do not have enough income to pay taxes in the first place. We have
identified the socio-economic/cultural challenges faced by indigenous
communities due to factors such as remoteness, reliance on traditional
lifestyles, lack of housing infrastructure, and employment patterns. Across
the board tax cuts do not factor in any of these challenges that will result
in an unfair burden continuing to be placed on indigenous Australians.
In 2015, there will be adjustments through the social security system for
low income households and pensioners and there will be an annual low
income supplement of $300 from 1 July 2012.193 This supplement will be
administered by Centrelink and there are eligibility criteria to be met. This
188. See, Carbon PollutionReduction Scheme Amendment (HouseholdAssistance) Bill 2010 (Cth).
189. SupportingAustralianHouseholds,supra note 154.
190. Ibid, see the analysis of the household assistance package at 17-35.
191. See discussion in the BC carbon tax case-study, above.
192. Supra note 146 at 40.
193. Australian Government, Department of Human Services, "Low Income Supplement", online:
<http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/low-income-supplement>.
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supplement will be administered by Centrelink and tehre are eligibility
criteria to be met. The details of this low income supplement will be
released closer to July 2012,1'9 It is intended to help some low-income
households who might not receive enough assistance through tax cuts or
government payments to offset their average expected cost impact under a
carbon price. This has the potential to compensate remote households for
the expected double cost burden. Unlike the BC "Low Income Climate
Action Tax Credit" this supplement is not independent of income, which
may be a disadvantage.
b. Exemptions and other mitigationpolicies
The Australian government has included a suite of measures to transition
to a low carbon economy. These include an expanded renewable energy
target,' 95 investment in renewable energy technologies,196 and energy
efficiency initiatives.197 The government has also allocated $250m over six
years from 2010-11 to expand the "Low Carbon Communities Program,"199
which pilots energy efficiency programs for low income households.
There has been a recent consultation period and details of the program
will be released in 2012.199 The government recognises that community
voluntary action plays an important role in reducing GHG emissions. 200
194. Ibid.
195. See Renewable Energy (Electricity)Act 2000 (Cth), together with various feed-in-tariff schemes
administered by the States.
196. $1Ob over 5 years from 2012-13 to establish the Clean Energy Finance Corporation to help
commercialise and deploy renewable energy and transform existing manufacturing businesses:
Australian Government, Clean Energy Finance Corporation, online: Australia <http://www.
climatechange.gov.au/govemment/initiatives/clean-energy-finance-corporation.aspx>; $3.2b over 9
years from 2011-2012 to establish the Australian Renewable Energy Agency to support Research and
Development, demonstration and commercialisation of renewable energy through competitive grants:
Australian Government, Arena Factsheet, online: Australia <http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/
Documents/clean-energy-future/ARENA-FACTSHEET.pdf>; $1.2b over 7 years from 2011-12 for
Clean Technology Program: Australian Govemment, Clean Technology Program, online: Australia
<http://www.innovation.gov.au/Industry/CleanEnergyFuture/Pages/CleanTechnologyProgram.aspx>.
197. Enhancement of the National Energy Savings Initiative. See, 2010 Report ofthe Prime Minister s
Task Group on Energy Efficiency, online: Australia <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/-/medial
submissions/pm-taskforce/report-prime-minister-task-group-energy-efficiency.pdf>.
198. Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Low Carbon
Communities, online: Australia <http://climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/low-carboncommunities.aspx>.
199. The author has made a submission focussing on the particular needs of indigenous Australians.
200. "Voluntary action will be recognised under the carbon price in four ways. First, the government
will take voluntary action into account when setting pollution caps. Voluntary action will be treated
as additional when accounting for Australia's pollution reduction targets after 2012. Second, in the
carbon pricing mechanism's flexible price period, carbon permit holders may voluntarily cancel their
permits. Third, a tax-deductible Pledge Fund will be established to help individuals buy and cancel
carbon permits. Fourth, any purchases of accredited GreenPower from the start of the carbon pricing
mechanism will be treated as voluntary action." See supra note 146 at 30.
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The suite of transition measures recognises that Australian households
are responsible for around 25% of covered emissions, so the measures
are intended to accelerate energy efficient uptake by households and to
increase the level of renewable energy generated by households. These are
positive initiatives, but it is important to consider how the initiatives will
impact indigenous communities. Will the incentive measures be equally
accessible to indigenous communities as compared to non-indigenous
communities? Many of the incentives relate to options that only home
owners or relatively high income earners can take advantage of.20 1 These
incentives may include household retrofits, insulation rebates, solar panel
rebates, incentives for solar hot water systems, and renewable energy
options, as well as rating systems to encourage the purchase of energy
efficient appliances and cars. There are significant barriers and market
failures to the uptake of energy efficiency measures in low income
households 202 and these will be exacerbated in indigenous communities
due to their remoteness, poor quality housing, and high percentage of
renters. 203 In very remote areas, non-indigenous households were 8 times
more likely than indigenous households to own their own homes. 204 The
Low Income Energy Efficiency Program may help to break down some of
these barriers. It aims to develop projects to improve the energy efficiency
of low income households in a range of goegraphic locations. Expressions
of interest for the $100m program closed in April 2012 and the successful
grants will be announced before the end of 2012.
There are a number of additional programs that may benefit indigenous
communities, both directly and indirectly. These include the allocation of
$946m in 2011-12 for the Biodiversity Fund to support restoration and
protection of biodiverse carbon stores, 205 allowing indigenous groups
to conserve and protect their land, and a regional structural adjustment
assistance package worth $200m over 7 years from 2012-2013 for regions
strongly affected by the introduction of a carbon price. Programs directed
to indigenous communities include $40m over five years from 2012 for
the Remote Indigenous Energy Program 206 to provide around 55 remote
indigenous communities with funding to install renewable energy systems,
201. As an example, see the solar rebate scheme.
202. Sullivan & Lee, supra note 69 at 155.
203. Renters find it hard to derive benefit from emission reduction initiatives because they have less
incentive to outlay the capital costs of emission reduction activities such as insulation, renewable
energy options, hot water systems, and cooking appliances.
204. 4713.0 Population Characteristics,supra note 165.
205. Australian Government, Clean Energy Future, Biodiversity Fund,online: Australia <http://www.
cleanenergyfuture.gov.aulbiodiversity-fund/>.
206. Remote Indigenous Energy Program,supra note 185.

Are climate change policies fair to vulnerable communities?

173

reducing reliance on diesel generation. Also in place is an investment of
$22m over 5 years from 2012-13 for the ongoing Indigenous Carbon
Farming Fund, which will provide support for Indigenous Australians
to implement projects under the Carbon Farming Initiative, specifically
providing specialists to work with Indigenous communities to develop
carbon farming projects and develop low-cost estimation and reporting
tools for abatement activities likely to have high indigenous participation,
such as savannah fire management. 2 07
IV. Discussion
In this section, we will draw upon the case studies to consider which design
features of carbon taxes and emission trading schemes make them more
(or less) amenable to being implemented in a way that is fair. Although
evaluating the fairness of carbon pricing instruments is undeniably
difficult and will not yield simple answers, we believe that our case studies
illustrate the necessity of doing so.
Our first main and general point is that evaluations of fairness require
consideration of a broad array of factors, from basic design features to
revenue-use policies. Certain groups, such as indigenous communities, are
impacted not only by the cost increases resulting from both carbon pricing
policies, but may be less able to access the policy options offered to mitigate
the cost increases. As such, it is essential to consider the entire policy
package to assess how fair a carbon pricing policy is. Our second point,
also general in nature, is that fairness evaluations must consider not only
how the cost burden of carbon pricing policies is distributed across income
groups, but also how the burden is distributed among groups according to
demographics such as race, gender, and region. While there is, as our case
studies illustrate, overlap between income levels and demographic groups,
the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of particular communities
is worthy of consideration in determining the fairness of a policy.
We will now move through the analytical framework we applied to
discuss what findings emerged. Starting with design, we note that breadth
of coverage is most important from the perspective of the effectiveness
of the measure. Although we did not evaluate the effectiveness of either
measure, it is safe to say that the broader the coverage of GHG emissions
the more effective the measure should be in terms of reducing emissions
(other factors being equal). As indigenous groups are uniquely vulnerable
to climate change, broader coverage should be positive for them. That
207. Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Indigenous
Carbon Farming Fund, online: Australia <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/
indigenous-carbon-farming-fund.aspx>.
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said, having an exemption for carbon taxes on reserve is, in our view, a
reasonable compromise between the goal of maximizing the effectiveness
of the carbon price and reducing the burden on First Nations living on
reserve. A reasonable compromise in the Australian context would include
the range of complementary initiatives specifically targeting indigenous
communities, such as the Remote Indigenous Energy Program.208
Differences between breadth of coverage in ETS and carbon taxes are
relatively minor. The Australian ETS will cover 65% and the BC carbon
tax 73% of GHG emissions. Further, there is nothing inherent in ETS or
carbon taxes to suggest that one will necessarily lead to broader coverage
(and, therefore, more effectiveness, holding the rate constant). Some might
argue that it is easier to create industry or company specific exemptions
from ETS than carbon taxes (especially downstream ones), or that carbon
taxes are more likely to apply broadly. It is possible, however, to create
exceptions in both policies and, thus, evaluations of fairness must consider
the specific design of a given carbon pricing policy.
The same conclusions can be drawn with respect to the rate of the
carbon pricing policy. The rate is relevant to the effectiveness of the
measure; however, both ETS and carbon taxes can establish variable rates.
The BC carbon tax established an initial rate of $10 per CO 2 e, rising to
$30 within a given time period. The Australian ETS in 2015 will start at
around $26, with a ceiling cap of $20 above the international rate with a
price floor of $15. One factor that distinguishes the two measures is that
the amount of revenue raised from carbon taxes may be more predictable,
since a greater number of variables will influence the price of emissions
permits and because initial permits may be grandfathered. This leads us to
a discussion of revenue, which we believe to be the most important point.
We believe that the generation of revenue and the choice of how to
spend that revenue is the single greatest determinant of the fairness of a
carbon pricing policy. In this regard our comparison suggests that carbon
taxes may be fairer at a general level because a key feature of carbon
taxes is that they inevitably generate revenue. Predictable revenue streams
may be helpful in designing and implementing mitigation policies. In
contrast, revenue projections from an ETS can be less certain, as they rely
upon variables such as future carbon prices and exchange rates. Further,
an emissions trading scheme will only generate revenue if permits are
auctioned rather than grandfathered; however, there is nothing to prevent
an ETS scheme from being designed in a way that generates revenue and
applies it in a fair manner. Nor is it a foregone conclusion that a government
208. Supra note 206 and 207.
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will only create offsetting policies with revenue generated from a carbon
tax. Governments can, as illustrated by the Australian case study, offer
complementary measures to the ETS.209 Similarly, there is nothing to
ensure that revenue from carbon taxes, once generated, will be allocated
fairly. So, as is often the case, the devil is in the details-in this case, the
design details.
While a more predictable revenue stream may make carbon taxes
more advantageous from a fairness perspective, the issue of how the
revenue is spent is critical. Certain tax policies or principles may make
taxes less flexible. We highlight two in particular: dedicating revenue (or
earmarking) and tax-shifting. With respect to dedicating revenues, there
is often a resistance within finance departments to earmark tax revenue
for particular purposes, as this can reduce government flexibility to
allocate revenue where it is necded based on a variety of circumstances.
In contrast, there is no such practice in ETS that would create resistance to
allocating revenue from permits to particular programs. This issue may not
be a major constraint as the BC carbon tax illustrates that governments can
overcome resistance to earmarking (the carbon tax revenues in that case
are dedicated to specific tax cuts and the low-income tax credit).
Another point of interest in distinguishing ETS from carbon taxes is
the "tax-shifting" mentality that has arisen around environmental taxes.
A great deal of momentum for environmental taxes was created some
years ago when environmentalists and economists realized that they
could agree wholeheartedly that redirecting taxes from "goods," such as
income and employment, to "bads" such as pollution and resource use,
was economically efficient and environmentally beneficial. While this
momentum was very positive in helping to expand the environmental
policy toolbox to include economic instruments, it may have created a
rigidity that limits alternative approaches, such as directing revenue to
funding environmental policies. One advantage of an ETS system may
therefore be that there is less entrenchment in the tendency to want to
use revenues for tax cuts, versus climate change mitigation, so it may
be more politically feasible to offer targeted assistance to disadvantaged
groups. Of course, there is nothing to prevent a carbon tax policy from
being designed so that revenue is directed to climate change mitigation,
as was done in Quebec, or to offset disproportionate impacts, but it may

209. It is estimated that the Australian govemment's tax concession will cost around $14.9m, which is
about half the revenue expected in the fixed price period. No estimates are yet available for the flexible
price period but relatively small fluctuations would be expected.

176 The Dalhousie Law Journal
be a harder political battle.2 10 In sum, while taxes have more predictable
revenue streams, they may be somewhat less flexible given the resistance
to ear-marking and the tax-shifting mentality. However, the bottom line
is that both instruments have the potential-should the political will be
present-to generate revenue and dedicate that revenue to policies that
are fair. So what, in our view, is needed to create fair mitigation policies?
To ensure a fair mitigation policy, we argue that revenue should
first be used to offset regressivity as well as the additional cost impacts
to disadvantaged groups, taking into account factors outside of revenue.
Care should be taken to design the policies in a way that maximizes their
accessibility to vulnerable groups. For instance, direct payments may
need to be used rather than tax rebates in order to ensure that they reach
target groups (who may not have enough income to justify filing a tax
return). When tax rebates are used, they should be refundable and targeted
at individuals versus households. BC's Low Income Tax Credit is both
refundable and targeted at individuals, which are positive features in an
analysis of fairness.
When direct payments are used, they also need to be designed in a way
that maximizes accessibility. For example, the Low Income Supplement
Payment introduced as part of the compensation package for household
assistance under the Australian ETS is an annual payment of $300, coming
into force on 1 July 2012.211 A qualifying person needs to lodge a claim
for this low income supplement. Care needs to be taken in designing such
programs to ensure that they are administratively accessible; for example,
would members of remote indigenous communities be in a position to take
advantage of these payments?
Direct payments should also be designed to take into account
additional costs faced by particular groups. The modelling used to help
design the ETS household assistant package 2 12 did not take into account
the additional expenses on goods and transport that those living in remote
areas will have to pay. Other measures in a given assistance package, such
as encouraging the uptake of energy efficiency measures, although helpful
to many groups, may not be equally accessible to renters or low-income
households. Climate change mitigation policies should be designed to be
widely accessible to all, including vulnerable groups such as indigenous
communities. For instance, as there are a higher percentage of renters in
indigenous communities, mitigation policies must be designed to ensure
210. For instance, Quebec's redevance annuelle has targeted revenue into climate change mitigation
policies: supra note 134.
211. Supra note 194.
212. Supra note 154.
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that they are not uniquely available to homeowners; for example, insulation
retrofits and solar panel rebates would not be accessible to tenants.
Once revenue is used to offset regressivity and other vulnerabilities
due to socio-economic or cultural factors, we would argue that remaining
revenue should be prioritized towards climate change mitigation, rather
than general tax cuts or other measures that bolster public support for
the measure. This is well illustrated by the transitionary support under
Australia's Clean Energy Legislative Package. Even though tax cuts may
increase economic efficiency, the economic gains of addressing climate
change, were they to be measured, may very well be greater. The difficulty,
of course, comes when politicians believe that the only way to pass a
measure like a carbon tax is by offering tax cuts. However, with strong
support for policy action on climate change, a measure that remained
revenue neutral but directed revenues at climate change mitigation rather
than tax cuts might also be politically viable.
From the perspective of procedural fairness, neither taxes nor
emissions trading schemes stand out as necessarily more or less fair. As we
noted, the breadth of taxes may render the political discussion surrounding
their implementation more accessible to the general public, thus enhancing
procedural fairness. At the same time, there is nothing that precludes an ETS
from being designed with a public process that engages various segments
of society, and not only the business stakeholders who will ultimately be
the permit holders. One feature that may distinguish carbon taxes is that
the direct costs of taxes renders the distributional impacts more visible and
measureable. As such, they may enable a discussion of fairness in the tax
instrument design or reform. But once again, neither carbon taxes or ETS
is inherently better from a procedural fairness standpoint.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the fairness of carbon pricing policies must be
assessed using more than the consideration of income. As already well
established in the literature, regressivity of carbon pricing instruments is
a critical part of any fairness assessment; however, we have argued that
there are a number of socio-economic and cultural factors characteristic of
certain vulnerable groups, such as indigenous communities, that lead to a
double burden of regressivity. In other words, the impact of carbon pricing
policies is affected by more than income levels.
We have argued that a singular emphasis on tax-shifting may be
misguided and that, while returning carbon tax revenues to taxpayers
through various policies is fine, the apportionment of those revenues
should take into account the impacts on vulnerable groups. All elements
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of carbon pricing policies must be evaluated to ascertain how they will
impact upon vulnerable groups. We have also argued that targeted policies
to mitigate this double burden be implemented with a carbon price. This
may be funded by the revenue generated by the policy or by other sources
of government revenue. We have argued that governments should deprioritize tax cuts in favour of mitigating impacts on vulnerable groups.
We have also argued in favour of devoting revenues generated by the
instruments to climate change mitigation in addition to, or instead of, tax
cuts.
Our analysis has shown that both carbon taxes and ETS policies have
the ability to engineer social justice outcomes through the revenue that
they generate and both the BC carbon tax and an Australian ETS use the
tax system for this purpose. At the same time, however, the tax system is
a relatively blunt instrument. The particular disadvantage of Indigenous
communities cannot be completely overcome by tax credits or allowable
deductions, nor will it be overcome by the suite of general complementary
measures or energy efficiency initiatives because of Indigenous
communities' remoteness, household type, and higher employment in
impacted sectors. As the Canadian case study demonstrated, something as
simple as a "Low Income Tax Credit" can go a long way towards mitigating
regressivity. Such programs, however, must rise concomitant with tax
increases and they must be accompanied by additional programs to reduce
the additional burden of cost increases for indigenous communities.
We have shown that there is a need for programs to specifically target
vulnerable populations. An example would be a specific incentive aimed
at making indigenous rental accommodation more energy efficient. On a
positive note, Australia's proposed carbon pricing policy includes some
examples of targeted programs for indigenous communities, such as the
Remote Indigenous Energy Program, but more can be done.
We conclude that carbon pricing policies have the potential to be
designed in a way that is fair to indigenous communities, but that the devil
is in the details. Both ETS and carbon taxes have cost implications for
disadvantaged groups such as indigenous peoples, but they can both be
designed in a way that compensates fairly for these impacts. Ultimately, it
is a political choice.

